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Abstract 
 
Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm’s 
stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and 
misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth 
to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive effects: a 
positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager’s 
wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. 
We show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega 
substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature. Using both regression and matching 
designs, and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals, restatements, and enforcement 
actions, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that 
the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that 
equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less 
averse to equity risk. 
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1.     Introduction 
 
 Although a considerable literature examines the relation between managerial equity 
incentives and financial misreporting, the empirical results have been mixed. The conceptual 
foundation of this literature is based on the notion that misreporting increases stock price, 
thereby increasing the value of the manager’s equity portfolio. Prior studies assume that a 
manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in stock price benefits more from 
misreporting. Accordingly, a number of studies test for a relation between the sensitivity of a 
manager’s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) and misreporting. Although the 
majority of these prior studies predict and document a positive relation between portfolio delta 
and misreporting, the results across these studies vary considerably (see Table 1 for a summary 
of the various research designs and results in this literature).1  
 With rare exception, prior work focuses on how managers benefit from an increase in 
stock price without considering the economic consequences of any corresponding changes in 
firm risk. This is an important omission because there are substantial monetary and nonmonetary 
risks associated with the decision to misreport (e.g., Karpoff et al., 2008a, b). If managers are 
risk-averse, and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, managers will trade 
off any expected reward and risk associated with the misreporting decision. In this case, both the 
sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) and the sensitivity 
of the manager’s wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will affect the manager’s decision to 
misreport, but not necessarily in the same manner. 
 In particular, if misreporting increases equity values and equity risk, then portfolio delta 
will have two countervailing effects on misreporting. First, as discussed in the prior misreporting 
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 For example, Erickson et al. (2006), Efendi et al. (2007), and Armstrong et al. (2010) find no evidence of a 
relation between the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to changes in stock price and misreporting. 
2 
literature, delta will encourage misreporting because delta captures the increase in value of a 
manager’s equity portfolio from an increase in stock price—the “reward effect.” Second, delta 
will discourage misreporting because delta amplifies the effect of equity risk on the total 
riskiness of a manager’s equity portfolio, generally discouraging risk-averse managers from 
taking risky projects—the “risk effect” (e.g., Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Carpenter, 
2000; Ross, 2004; Lewellen, 2006; Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012). As a result of these two 
countervailing effects, the theoretical relation between portfolio delta and misreporting is 
ambiguous. This observation may explain why prior empirical research finds mixed evidence on 
the relation between portfolio delta and misreporting. 
 In contrast, portfolio vega unambiguously encourages misreporting. Unlike delta, 
portfolio vega provides managers with an incentive (or less of a disincentive in the case of a risk-
averse manager) to increase firm risk. If misreporting increases both equity values and equity 
risk, ceteris paribus, managers with greater risk-taking incentives will be more likely to 
misreport because they will be less averse to the increased equity risk that accompanies 
misreporting. Thus, to understand the incentive effects of a manager’s equity portfolio on the 
decision to misreport, it is necessary to simultaneously consider both the delta and vega of the 
portfolio.2  
In contrast to most prior research, we focus on the role of portfolio vega in influencing 
the decision to misreport. We first replicate prior research that examines the relation between 
managers’ portfolio delta and each of three common measures of misreporting: discretionary 
                                                 
2
 To illustrate, consider a simple example of two Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) with very different equity 
portfolios. The first CEO holds in-the-money stock options that provide him with a relatively high delta and a 
relatively low vega. The second CEO holds at-the-money stock options that provide him with a relatively low delta 
and a relatively high vega. Ceteris paribus, the second CEO has a stronger incentive to assume risk associated with 
misreporting because at-the-money options have an intrinsic value that is insensitive to stock price declines. In 
contrast, the first CEO already has considerable intrinsic value, and thus will have a disincentive to take risky 
actions because such actions jeopardize the value of his options (i.e., a significant stock price decline will also 
induce a significant decline in his equity portfolio).  
3 
accruals, accounting restatements, and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). Consistent with prior research, we find evidence 
of a positive relation between delta and misreporting using a regression design (e.g., Bergstresser 
and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006), but no evidence of a relation between delta and 
misreporting when using a matched-pair design (e.g., Erickson et al., 2006; Efendi et al., 2007; 
Armstrong et al., 2010). In contrast to the mixed results reported in prior literature focusing on 
portfolio delta, when we replace delta with vega, regardless of research design, we find strong 
evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting. Finally, when we jointly consider 
both delta and vega, regardless of research design, we find that vega continues to exhibit a strong 
positive relation with misreporting, but that delta is not incrementally related to misreporting. 
Consistent with misreporting affecting risk, and thus delta providing two countervailing 
incentive effects, our results suggest that the incentive effects of portfolio vega subsume those of 
portfolio delta. More specifically, absent controlling for portfolio vega, managers with high delta 
appear more likely to misreport not because delta provides them with incentives to misreport, but 
rather, because such managers also have high vega. Our results also suggest that the effect of 
vega on misreporting is economically large and larger than many other determinants of 
misreporting. 
The theoretical and conceptual arguments for why equity incentives engender 
misreporting predict not only that managers with greater risk-taking incentives are more likely to 
misreport, but also that, within a firm, increases in risk-taking incentives increase the likelihood 
that a particular manager misreports. To examine this issue, we repeat our analyses controlling 
for firm fixed effects. We find that the positive relation between vega and misreporting is robust 
to including firm fixed effects, and that the incentive effects of portfolio delta continue to be 
4 
subsumed by portfolio vega. These results make it less likely that vega is capturing some omitted 
executive or firm-specific characteristic that explains misreporting in the cross-section.  
 We also conduct a number of supplemental analyses to assess the sensitivity of our 
results to various research design choices related to the measurement of equity incentives and to 
better understand the nature of the relationship between equity portfolio vega and misreporting. 
First, we repeat our analyses considering the incentives of both the top management team and the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Consistent with recent research that documents a role for 
executives other than the CEO in misreporting (e.g., Jiang et al., 2010; Feng et al., 2011), we 
find that our results apply to the equity incentives of both the top management team and the 
CEO.  
 Second, we repeat our analyses using several alternative measures of equity incentives 
used in prior research, such as the amount of equity pay, option moneyness (i.e., the intrinsic 
value of option holdings), option gamma (i.e., the sensitivity of the portfolio delta to changes in 
stock price), the number of options granted during the year, and equity ownership. Reflecting the 
fact that much of the prior literature does not directly focus on risk-taking incentives, many of 
these variables only indirectly relate to risk-taking incentives. Consistent with this interpretation, 
we continue to find strong evidence of a relation between portfolio vega and misreporting and no 
evidence of a relation between delta and misreporting after including these additional measures. 
We find that the amount of equity pay and option moneyness are incrementally positively related 
to misreporting and that option gamma, the number of options granted, and equity ownership are 
not incrementally related to misreporting.  
 Third, since portfolio vega is determined by both option grants as well as subsequent 
changes in stock price, we decompose vega into the portion attributable to recent performance 
5 
and the portion attributable to features of the option grant. Our results suggest that the positive 
relation between vega and misreporting is driven by the component of vega attributable to the 
features of the grant rather than subsequent performance. 
Collectively, our results suggest a more nuanced view of how equity incentives relate to 
misreporting. In particular, our results suggest that equity holdings provide managers with 
incentives to misreport not because they tie their wealth to equity values, but because they tie 
their wealth to equity risk.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 reviews the 
literature on executives’ equity incentives and misreporting. Section 3 discusses our sample and 
variable measurement choices. Section 4 describes our research design. Section 5 presents our 
results, and Section 6 provides concluding remarks and discusses the limitations of our study. 
 
2.     Prior literature 
2.1.  Financial misreporting and equity risk 
 Although prior studies have discussed the potential consequences to managers found to 
have engaged in financial misreporting, prior literature has not focused on how the risk/reward 
tradeoff affects managers’ incentives to misreport. Prior literature suggests two reasons why 
financial misreporting is associated with a manager’s subjective assessment of equity risk. First, 
misreporting increases the likelihood of extreme negative returns. While successful misreporting 
temporarily inflates a stock’s price, once it is detected, there is typically a significant decline in 
that price. For example, Feroz et al. (1991) and Dechow et al. (1996) find a negative stock return 
of –9% to –10% on the first day the SEC announces an enforcement action (AAER) against the 
firm. Karpoff et al. (2008a) find that firms lose, on average, 38% of their market value as a result 
6 
of SEC enforcement actions. Similarly, Palmrose et al. (2004) document an average market-
adjusted return of –20% over a two-day announcement window for restatements associated with 
fraud, and Bardos et al. (2011) find that stock prices begin to decline several months in advance 
of the restatement announcement. Second, misreporting by its very nature decreases the quality 
of financial reports and obfuscates the firm’s true value. As a result, the level of uncertainty in 
the market for the firm’s shares may increase (e.g., Kravet and Shevlin, 2010; Bhattacharya et 
al., 2012). Thus, financial misreporting can be thought of as increasing the manager’s subjective 
assessment of both expected equity value and expected equity risk.  
2.2.  Equity incentives and risk-taking 
There is a large literature that shows that equity ownership can provide underdiversified, 
risk-averse managers with an incentive to reject risky, positive net present value projects. Early 
studies argued that one potential solution to this risk-related agency problem is to compensate 
risk-averse managers with stock options, because the convexity of the option’s payoff can offset 
the manager’s risk aversion (e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985). However, subsequent studies (e.g., 
Lambert et al., 1991; Carpenter, 2000; Ross, 2004; Lewellen, 2006) note that stock options not 
only increase the convexity of the manager’s payoff by increasing the sensitivity of the 
manager’s wealth to changes in risk (vega), but also increase the sensitivity of the manager’s 
wealth to changes in stock price (delta). These studies show that the incentive effects of delta and 
vega are not always reinforcing, and that the net effect of options on risk-taking incentives is 
theoretically ambiguous.3  
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 Highlighting the need to differentiate between incentives provided by delta and vega, recent studies in the 
broader risk-taking literature acknowledge the different theoretical predictions regarding the relationship between 
delta, vega, and firm risk, and account for them separately in their empirical specifications (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; 
Low, 2009; Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012). 
7 
With regard to the incentive effects of delta, prior theoretical studies show that delta has 
two countervailing effects on a risk-averse manager’s decision to adopt a risky, positive net 
present value project. On the one hand, delta will encourage project adoption because delta 
captures the increase in value of the manager’s wealth from an increase in stock price, or the 
“reward effect.” On the other hand, delta will discourage project adoption because delta 
magnifies the effect of a change in stock price on the change in the manager’s wealth, and thus 
magnifies the effect of stock price volatility on the volatility of the risk-averse manager’s wealth, 
the “risk effect.” As a result of these countervailing effects, for projects that increase firm risk, 
the net incentive effect of delta is theoretically ambiguous. In contrast, these studies show that 
vega provides managers with an unambiguous incentive to adopt risky projects. The intuition for 
this result is that vega measures the increase in the value of the manager’s portfolio for an 
increase in firm risk. Thus, ceteris paribus, managers with high vega are less averse to risky 
projects than are managers with low vega, and hence will be more inclined to take risky projects. 
When misreporting is viewed as a special case of a risky project that increases both 
expected equity values and equity risk, the predictions from the risk-taking literature carry over 
to the incentive effects of delta and vega for misreporting. Similar to empirical studies in the 
broader risk-taking literature (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009; Chava and Purnanandam, 
2010; Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012), we acknowledge that our predictions regarding the 
incentive effects of delta and vega depend on whether the project — in this case misreporting — 
increases or decreases risk. If misreporting increases stock price but either decreases or does not 
affect risk, the incentive effects of delta (i.e., the “reward effect” and the “risk effect”) will be 
reinforcing, and we expect to find a positive relation between delta and misreporting and no 
relation between vega and misreporting. However, if misreporting increases stock price and also 
8 
increases risk, the incentive effects of delta will be countervailing, and we expect to find no 
relation between delta and misreporting and a positive relation between vega and misreporting. 
We believe that misreporting is best characterized as a project that increases both the level and 
risk of stock price, and thus expect to find that much of the incentive to misreport comes from 
portfolio vega. Ultimately, however, whether the incentive effects of delta are reinforcing or 
countervailing, and which incentives dominate—those provided by delta or vega—are empirical 
questions.  
2.3.  Equity incentives and financial misreporting 
A large literature examines the relation between managers’ equity incentives and 
financial misreporting (see Table 1). In general, studies in this literature predict that managerial 
equity holdings and the structure of their annual flow pay provides them with incentives to 
manipulate financial reports. For example, Bergstresser and Philippon, (2006) find evidence of a 
positive relation between the CEO’s portfolio delta and the magnitude of the firm’s discretionary 
accruals. Burns and Kedia (2006) find evidence of a positive relation between the CEO’s 
portfolio delta and accounting restatements. Jiang et al. (2010) and Feng et al. (2011) extend 
these results by showing that the portfolio delta of other top managers (e.g., the Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO)) is also related to misreporting. In contrast to these studies, Efendi et al. (2007) 
find evidence of a positive relation between the intrinsic value or “moneyness” of the CEO’s 
option portfolio and accounting restatements, but no relation between the CEO’s portfolio delta 
and accounting restatements. Erickson et al. (2006) also find no evidence of a relation between 
either the CEO’s or the top management team’s portfolio delta and AAERs, and conclude that 
managers’ equity holdings do not provide them with incentives to misreport. Similarly, 
9 
Armstrong et al. (2010) find no evidence of a relation between the CEO’s portfolio delta, and 
either accounting restatements, AAERs, or shareholder litigation and reach a similar conclusion.  
One explanation for the mixed results documented by prior literature could be differences 
in sample size or research design. For example, studies that find a positive relation between 
portfolio delta and misreporting tend to use a regression design (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 
2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006), whereas studies that find no relation between portfolio delta and 
misreporting tend to use a matched-pair design (e.g., Erickson et al., 2006; Efendi et al., 2007; 
Armstrong et al., 2010). For this reason, we use both regression and matched-pair designs in our 
empirical tests. Another explanation for these mixed results is that misreporting increases risk, in 
which case, delta will have two countervailing effects on a risk-averse manager’s incentives to 
misreport, resulting in an ambiguous net effect. In contrast, if misreporting increases risk, vega 
(unlike delta) is expected to provide managers with an unambiguous incentive to misreport. 
Therefore, in contrast to earlier studies, we focus on the relation between portfolio vega and 
misreporting.  
 Some prior studies examine how different elements of option compensation provide 
incentives to misreport, but do not focus specifically on the risk-taking incentives provided by 
portfolio vega. For example, Cheng and Farber (2008) examine the relation between 
misreporting and the number of options granted to managers during the year. They conjecture 
that “too high a level of options can induce excessive risk-taking in investment decisions ... when 
these investments do not produce positive returns, managers may engage in earnings 
management to mask underperformance.” However, because options provide both delta and 
vega, options not do unambiguously provide incentives to take risks. Hence, the relation between 
vega and misreporting cannot be inferred from the relation between the number of options and 
10 
misreporting. In this regard, our study differs from prior research in that we analyze the effect of 
risk-taking incentives provided by options (vega) rather than the effect of option holdings in and 
of themselves.  
 Efendi et al. (2007) focus not on the number of options but their moneyness. Specifically, 
they find a positive association between the value of in-the-money stock options and 
misreporting. However, deep in-the-money stock options generally have low vega, and do not 
provide strong risk-taking incentives. Therefore, even though Efendi et al. (2007) examine a 
specific aspect of the manager’s option portfolio, their results do not provide insight on whether 
risk-taking incentives are associated with misreporting. Since deep in-the-money stock options 
generally have low vega, if anything, the evidence in Efendi et al. (2007) suggests that risk-
taking incentives are negatively associated with misreporting. Similarly, Burns and Kedia (2006) 
conjecture that option convexity provides managers with incentives to misreport. They measure 
option convexity as the sensitivity of portfolio delta to changes in stock price (option gamma), 
and find a positive association between option gamma and misreporting. However, because 
option gamma measures how the slope of the manager’s payoff changes with respect to stock 
price, it fails to capture the most important feature of risk-taking incentives: how the manager’s 
wealth is affected by changes in risk.4  
 
3. Sample and variable measurement 
3.1.  Sample construction 
Our tests require data on executive compensation and equity holdings, firm performance, 
and proxies for misreporting. We construct our sample by collecting data on executive 
compensation and equity holdings from Execucomp, stock returns, and financial statement 
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 We examine the relation between misreporting and these alternative measures of equity incentives in Section 
5. 
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information from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)/Compustat Industrial file, 
accounting restatements from AuditAnalytics, and SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases from the Center for Financial Reporting and Management. Our sample is constructed as 
the intersection of these four data sets, and consists of 20,445 firm-years (2,446 firms) over the 
period 1992 to 2009.  
 
Execucomp. We collect data on executive compensation and equity holdings of the top five 
named executives (including the CEO) from Execucomp. We require data on cash compensation 
for the top five executives, and sufficient data to estimate the sensitivity of the value of each 
executive’s portfolio to changes in stock price and risk, per Core and Guay (2002).  
 
CRSP/Compustat Industrial. We require returns during the fiscal year from CRSP, and the 
following variables from Compustat: net income (IB); market value (PRCC_F multiplied by 
CSHO); book value (CEQ); total liabilities (LT); total assets (AT); receivables (RECT); gross 
and net plant, property, and equipment (PPEGT and PPENT); inventory (INVT); research and 
development expense (XRD); advertising expense (XAD); interest expense (XINT); proceeds 
from share and debt issuances (SSTK and DLTIS); the contribution of acquisitions to sales 
(AQS); positive sales (SALE); and cash flow from operations (OANCF less XIDOC).5 We also 
collect data on sales and cash flow from operations to estimate rolling ten-year volatilities and 
require sales and cash flow from operations in three of the ten years. Additionally, we eliminate 
firm-years with insufficient information to calculate discretionary accruals (see Section 3.2.1). 
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 Missing values for receivables, inventories, research and development expense, advertising expense, interest 
expense, proceeds from share and debt issuances, and acquisitions are set to zero. 
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AuditAnalytics. We collect, but do not require, data on accounting restatements from 
AuditAnalytics. To be included in our sample, each restatement must have a start and end date. 
We use these dates to determine the fiscal year to which the restatement applies. A firm is 
classified as restating its results for a given year, if any financial results (quarterly, annual, or 
otherwise) are subsequently restated. This classification tracks the year(s) to which the 
restatement applies, rather than the year in which the restatement is announced.  
 
Center for Financial Reporting and Management. We collect, but do not require, data on SEC 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) from the Center for Financial 
Reporting and Management. This database tracks all SEC enforcement releases relating to 
accounting fraud or misrepresentation (see Dechow et al., 2011, for a description). To be 
included in our sample, each AAER must refer to a specific period during which the accounting 
fraud or misrepresentation occurred. The firm is said to be named in an AAER during a given 
year if the SEC published an AAER that identifies accounting fraud or misrepresentation 
occurring at the firm during the year. Similar to restatements, we track the year of the 
misreporting, rather than the year the AAER is announced.  
3.2.  Variable measurement 
3.2.1.  Measures of misreporting 
 We examine the relation between equity incentives and misreporting using three 
measures of misreporting that are common in the literature: the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Jiang et al., 2010), accounting restatements 
(e.g., Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007), and AAERs (e.g., Erickson et al., 2006; 
Armstrong et al., 2010). Examining the relation between incentives and misreporting using three 
13 
proxies for misreporting strengthens inferences relative to prior studies that focus exclusively on 
a single measure of misreporting (see Table 1). By using three measures of misreporting, we aim 
to show that our inferences apply to misreporting in general and are not specific to any one 
measure of misreporting. 
 Following prior literature, we construct our measure of discretionary accruals, Discretion, 
as the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated from each of the following three 
models of accruals: (i) modified Jones (1991), (ii) Dechow and Dichev (2002), and (iii) 
McNichols (2002).6 Each of these models expresses noncash earnings (i.e., accruals) as a 
function of economic determinants. Discretionary accruals are calculated as the residual, or 
unexpected, accruals from each of these three models. Positive discretionary accruals are thought 
to be indicative of managers exercising income-increasing discretion, and negative discretionary 
accruals are thought to be indicative of income-decreasing discretion. As such, we follow prior 
literature (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Jiang et al., 2010) and use the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, Discretion, as our measure of misreporting. The primary advantage of 
using discretionary accruals as a measure of misreporting is that it is a continuous measure with 
considerable cross-sectional variation. The primary disadvantage of this measure is that, because 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) provides managers with discretion in 
financial reporting, large discretionary accruals are not necessarily indicative of intentional 
misrepresentation or fraud.  
 Unlike discretionary accruals, an accounting restatement indicates that the firm 
retroactively changed its financial results. Because prior research suggests restatements can be 
the result of both benign errors and intentional misrepresentation, we restrict our analysis to only 
those restatements classified by AuditAnalytics as relating to fraud, misrepresentation, or an 
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 Results are robust to using the model of discretionary accruals in Larcker et al. (2007). 
14 
investigation by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (e.g., Hennes et al., 
2008). The primary advantage of using restatements as a measure of misreporting is that we can 
identify specific instances in which financial results were misreported. The primary disadvantage 
is that restatements are conditional on the company either voluntarily restating or being forced to 
restate by the SEC. We code the variable Restatement equal to one if any of the firm’s financial 
results (quarterly, annual, or otherwise) are subsequently restated. 
 Unlike discretionary accruals or restatements, AAERs are issued by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission during or at the conclusion of an investigation for alleged accounting 
and/or auditing misconduct. Using AAERs as a measure of misreporting has two advantages. 
First, the use of AAERs as a proxy for misreporting avoids some of the potential biases induced 
in samples based on voluntary restatements or on researchers’ assumptions about the 
determinants of expected accruals. Second, AAERs are also likely to capture a group of the most 
egregious cases of misreporting, as the SEC has limited resources and likely pursues the most 
economically important cases. The primary disadvantage of using AAERs as a measure of 
misreporting is that AAERs are conditional on detection by the SEC. Thus, tests based on 
AAERs are joint tests of both misreporting and detection. We code the variable AAER equal to 
one if the SEC published an AAER that identifies accounting fraud or misrepresentation 
occurring at the firm during the year.
7
 
3.2.2.  Measures of incentives 
 Much of the research on the effect of equity incentives on misreporting uses the 
sensitivity of the manager’s equity portfolio to changes in stock price, or portfolio delta, as the 
primary measure of equity incentives. However, a variety of different measures have been used 
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 As described below, all misreporting variables are measured in year t and all incentive variables are measured 
in year t–1. 
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in this literature (see Table 1). In general, studies in this literature use either measures of flow 
pay (e.g., Larcker et al., 2007), the amount of equity ownership (e.g., Cheng and Warfield, 
2005), the intrinsic value of option holdings (e.g., Efendi et al., 2007), or portfolio delta either 
unscaled (e.g., Burns and Kedia, 2006) or scaled by pay (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). 
The lack of standardized measures of equity incentives may potentially explain the conflicting 
results reported in the literature. Moreover, most of these measures are not focused on how the 
manager’s wealth is affected by changes in risk. 
 In our primary tests, we measure incentives using total cash compensation, the sensitivity 
of the manager’s wealth to changes in equity price (portfolio delta), and the sensitivity of the 
manager’s wealth to changes in equity risk (portfolio vega). Consistent with prior work, we focus 
on the equity incentives of the top management team (e.g., Erickson et al., 2006; Jiang et al., 
2010; Feng et al., 2011).8 In particular, our measure of the top management team’s portfolio 
delta, Delta, is the natural logarithm of one plus the average portfolio delta for the top five 
highest-paid executives (including the CEO). Following Core and Guay (2002), we calculate an 
executive’s portfolio delta as the dollar change in the executive’s equity portfolio for a 1% 
change in stock price. Similarly, our measure of the top management team’s portfolio vega, 
Vega, is the natural logarithm of one plus the average portfolio vega for the top five executives at 
the firm. Following Core and Guay (2002), we calculate Vega as the dollar change in the 
executive’s equity portfolio for a 0.01 change in the firm’s stock return volatility.  
 To assess the robustness of our results to our measurement choices, we also consider 
several alternative measures of incentives used in prior literature. First, we calculate both Delta 
and Vega using only the CEO’s equity portfolio, CEODelta and CEOVega, respectively. Second, 
                                                 
8
 We consider the top management team to consist of the top five highest-paid executives, including the CEO. If 
the firm discloses pay or equity holdings for fewer than five executives, we calculate our measures of equity 
incentives using the number of top executives for which pay and equity holdings are available. 
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we deflate Delta and Vega by either salary or cash compensation, labeled ScaledDelta and 
ScaledVega, respectively (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007). Third, we 
consider five alternative measures of incentives common in the literature: (1) EquityComp, 
calculated as the ratio of equity-based compensation to total compensation (e.g., Larcker et al., 
2007); (2) Moneyness, calculated as the ratio of the option portfolio’s intrinsic value to salary 
(e.g., Efendi et al., 2007); (3) Ownership, calculated as the number of options, shares of 
restricted stock, and shares of unrestricted stock held by the manager scaled by total shares 
outstanding (e.g., Cheng and Warfield, 2005); (4) Options, calculated as the number of options 
granted during the year as a fraction of total shares outstanding (e.g., Cheng and Farber, 2008); 
and (5) Gamma, calculated as the sensitivity of portfolio delta to changes in stock price (e.g., 
Burns and Kedia, 2006). Examining the relation between several measures of equity incentives 
and misreporting strengthens our inferences and helps to ensure that our results are not an artifact 
of specific measurement choices. 
3.3.      Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A reports descriptive 
statistics for each measure of misreporting. Panel A shows that 3% of our sample had 
restatements related to fraud or misrepresentation and that 2% of our sample was the subject of 
an SEC AAER.9 Panel A also shows that average unsigned discretionary accruals range from 
7.74% to 12.21% of total assets, depending on the model. Panel B reports descriptive statistics 
for several firm characteristics. In particular, the average book-to-market ratio for firms in our 
sample is 0.5 and the average leverage (debt-to-asset) ratio is 0.52. The average firm is 
approximately 26 years old and has annual sales growth of 14%.  
                                                 
9
 Consistent with Hennes et al. (2008), we find that 13% of our sample restated their financial results, but that 
only 3% of our sample had restatements relating specifically to fraud or misreporting. 
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Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the various incentive variables. The mean 
(median) of the natural logarithm of annual cash compensation and the Core-Guay portfolio 
sensitivities, Delta and Vega, are 6.29 (6.25), 4.46 (4.44), and 2.96 (2.98), respectively. Panel C 
also shows that the top five executives have a mean (median) equity-to-total pay ratio of 0.43 
(0.37) and own 1.34% (0.70%) of the firm. Additionally, the intrinsic value of the average top 
five executive’s option portfolio (i.e., Moneyness) is about ten times the value of his or her salary 
(mean Moneyness of 9.97). Panel D compares the mean and median values of the incentive 
variables in the full sample, the restatement sample (Restatement=1), and the AAER sample 
(AAER=1). Regardless of whether restatements or AAERs are used to measure misreporting, 
except for Ownership, the mean and median values of all of the equity incentive variables are 
significantly higher in the misreporting sample.  
 
4. Research design 
 Our research design choices closely follow prior research. Specifically, we examine the 
relation between equity incentives and misreporting using both regression tests (e.g., 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006) and matched-sample tests (e.g., 
Erickson et al., 2006; Efendi et al., 2007; Armstrong et al., 2010). For our regression tests, we 
replicate a representative regression used in prior research examining the relation between 
portfolio delta and a specific misreporting proxy. We then examine whether inferences are 
sensitive to controlling for risk-taking incentives (i.e., Vega), and whether within-firm variation 
in portfolio delta and portfolio vega explains within-firm variation in misreporting by including 
firm fixed effects in the specification. For our matched-sample tests, we replicate two types of 
matched-pair designs used in prior research: size-and-industry matched-pairs and propensity 
score matched-pairs.  
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4.1.  Regression tests 
 We estimate a series of regressions that take the form: 
 Misreportingt = θ Incentivest-1 + β Controlst-1 + εt , (1)  
where Misreporting is one of three measures of misreporting (Discretion, Restatement, or 
AAER), Incentives is the vector of incentive variables (CashComp, Delta, and Vega), and 
Controls is a vector of control variables. Consistent with prior research, all independent variables 
are measured one year prior to the measure of misreporting and inferences are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm and year (all variables are defined in Appendix A).10  
 Because prior studies generally focus on a single measure of misreporting and use 
different control variables depending on the measure of misreporting being examined, the vector 
of control variables, Controls, varies depending on the measure of misreporting.  
 
Discretionary accruals. Following prior research, we estimate the relation between incentives 
and discretionary accruals controlling for firm size (Size), growth opportunities (BM), leverage 
(Leverage), firm age (FirmAge), past accounting performance (ROA), past stock performance 
(Returns), capital intensity (Capital), and intangible assets (Intangibles). Additionally, because 
prior research suggests the volatility of a firm’s operating environment is an important 
determinant of its discretionary accruals (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Jiang et al., 
2010), we also control for the volatility of cash flows (σCFO) and the volatility of sales (σSales). 
 
Restatements. Following prior research, we control for firm size (Size), growth opportunities 
(BM), leverage (Leverage), firm age (FirmAge), past accounting performance (ROA), past stock 
                                                 
10
 All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
19 
performance (Returns), capital intensity (Capital), and intangible assets (Intangibles). 
Additionally, because prior research suggests that the amount of external financing (Financing), 
the size of any acquisition that year (Acquisition), and interest coverage (InterestCov) are 
important determinant of restatements (e.g., Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007), we 
include these variables as additional controls when estimating the relation between equity 
incentives and restatements. 
 
AAERs. Following prior research, we control for firm size (Size), growth opportunities (BM), 
leverage (Leverage), firm age (FirmAge), past accounting performance (ROA), past stock 
performance (Returns), the capital intensity (Capital), and intangible assets (Intangibles). 
Additionally, because prior research suggests that the amount of external financing (Financing), 
the size of any acquisition that year (Acquisition), sales growth (SalesGrowth), and the size of 
firms’ inventories (Inventory) and receivables (Receivables) are important determinants of 
AAERs (e.g., Erickson et al., 2006; Feng et al., 2011), we include these variables as additional 
controls when estimating the relation between equity incentives and AAERs.  
  
 We estimate Eq. (1) pooling all firms and years in our sample. When the measure of 
misreporting is continuous (e.g., Discretion), we estimate Eq. (1) using linear regression. When 
the measure of misreporting is dichotomous (e.g., AAER), we estimate Eq. (1) using probit 
regression.11 While estimating Eq. (1) using a pooled sample is consistent with prior research, it 
cannot identify whether the effect of managers’ equity incentives comes from explaining 
variation in misreporting across firms (i.e., cross-sectional variation) or variation in misreporting 
                                                 
11
 We assess statistical significance using t-statistics (linear specifications) and z-statistics (nonlinear 
specifications) both based on standard errors clustered by firm and year. Since t-statistics and z-statistics are based 
on the same asymptotic distribution (i.e., the normal), for simplicity, we refer to all test statistics as t-statistics. 
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within firms (i.e., time-series variation). The distinction between variation across firms and 
variation within firms is important because the theoretical and conceptual arguments regarding 
how equity incentives relate to misreporting predict that (i) managers with greater equity 
incentives are more likely to misreport, which is a cross-sectional prediction, and (ii) managers 
who experience an increase in equity incentives are more likely to misreport, which is a time-
series prediction. 
 To determine whether within-firm variation in equity incentives explains within-firm 
variation in misreporting, we estimate an augmented version of Eq. (1) that includes firm fixed 
effects. This research design eliminates most of the cross-sectional variation in managers’ equity 
incentives and relies primarily on within-firm (i.e., time-series) variation in incentives. If the 
relation between equity incentives and misreporting is driven primarily by cross-sectional 
differences in firm characteristics, then holding the firm constant, we expect to find no evidence 
of a relation between incentives and misreporting. However, if within-firm variation in 
incentives explains within-firm variation in misreporting, we expect to find a relation between 
incentives and misreporting holding the firm constant (i.e., including firm fixed effects). 
4.2. Matched-sample tests 
 In addition to standard regression tests, we also examine the relation between equity 
incentives and misreporting using two sets of matched-sample tests. The first set of tests follows 
the outcome-based matching procedure used by Erickson et al. (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007). 
Specifically, we form one-to-one matched-pairs by matching each misreporting firm to a non-
misreporting firm based on industry and total assets.12 Because this matching procedure matches 
misreporting firms to non-misreporting firms, we construct separate matched-samples for each of 
                                                 
12
 We define industries according to the 48 Fama-French industry groups, and consider only matches where the 
non-misreporting firm's total assets are not more (less) than 1.3 (0.7) times that of the misreporting firm. The 
matching procedure corresponds to those described in Erickson et al. (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007). 
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our two binary measures of misreporting, Restatement and AAERs. We then test for differences 
in equity incentives between the misreporting sample and the matched-sample.  
 The second set of tests follows the propensity score matching procedure used by 
Armstrong et al. (2010). Specifically, we form one-to-one matched-pairs by estimating a 
propensity score as a function of control variables and then numerically solving for the set of 
matched-pairs that minimizes the difference in propensity scores and maximizes the difference in 
observed risk-taking incentives (Vega).13 Following Armstrong et al. (2010), in the first step we 
estimate the propensity score for Vega as a function of 18 control variables.14 The predicted value 
from this first step serves as the propensity score. In the second step, we employ a non-bipartite 
matching algorithm to simultaneously minimize the difference in propensity scores (i.e., the 
predicted level of risk-taking incentives) and maximize the difference in observed risk-taking 
incentives. Specifically, we divide the sample into treatment firms (firm i) and matched-sample 
firms (firm j) by numerically solving for the set of matches that minimizes the sum of the 
pairwise distance measure:    
Distancei,j = 
(Pscorei – Pscorej) 
2
 
. 
(Incentivei – Incentivej)
 2
 
 
(2) 
  
 
 
We then assess the success of the resulting matched-pairs by testing for covariate balance 
between treatment firms and matched-sample firms. Specifically, we test for cross-sample 
differences in the values of the control variables used to calculate the propensity score. A 
successful match is one where cross-sample differences in the variables used to calculate the 
propensity score are minimal. Finally, we test for a difference in the level of misreporting 
between the treatment and control samples. For a successful match, where the treatment and 
                                                 
13
 The matching procedure corresponds to that described in Armstrong et al. (2010), with the exception that we 
construct a propensity score based on Vega rather than Delta. 
14
 We include the union of all control variables used in our regression design as well as Delta and CashComp. 
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control samples are similar along all measured dimensions except for observed risk-taking 
incentives (Vega), any difference in the level of misreporting between the two samples is 
attributable to the difference in risk-taking incentives (see Rosenbaum, 2002, for more details).  
 
5.          Results 
5.1. Regression analysis 
5.1.1.  Risk-taking incentives and discretion in reported earnings 
Table 3 presents results from using discretionary accruals to measure misreporting. Panel 
A presents results from estimating pooled regressions. For each measure of discretionary 
accruals, we estimate four regression specifications. The first two specifications consider Delta 
and Vega separately, and the third specification considers both variables simultaneously. To 
assess the relative economic magnitude of the effects, we estimate a fourth specification in which 
all of the independent variables are transformed into scaled decile ranks that range from zero to 
one. As a result, each coefficient in this specification measures the change in discretionary 
accruals when moving from the bottom decile to the top decile of the respective variable.15  
Three of our findings are noteworthy. First, consistent with prior research (e.g., 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006), for two of the three measures of discretionary accruals, we 
find a positive relation between discretionary accruals and Delta (t-stats of 2.97, 1.96, and 1.23, 
respectively). Second, across all three measures of discretionary accruals, we find a positive 
relation between discretionary accruals and Vega (t-stats of 4.60, 4.22, and 4.28, respectively). 
Finally, across all three measures of discretionary accruals, when the incentive effects of 
portfolio delta and portfolio vega are considered simultaneously, the relation between Delta and 
                                                 
15
 We use the decile rank of each independent variable to ensure that all independent variables are of similar 
scale. This, in turn, allows us to meaningfully compare the relative economic significance of each variable. The 
ranked specification has the added advantage of being robust to both outliers and nonlinearities. Accordingly, this 
analysis also serves as a sensitivity check of our primary regression specification. 
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discretionary accruals is statistically insignificant (t-stats of –0.83, –0.18, and –0.82, 
respectively) and the relation between Vega and discretionary accruals remains highly 
statistically significant (t-stats of 4.40, 4.12, and 4.45, respectively). These results suggest that 
the incentive effects of portfolio vega on misreporting almost completely subsume the incentive 
effects of portfolio delta.  
The economic effect of Vega on the magnitude of discretionary accruals is also large. In 
particular, when discretionary accruals are measured using the modified Jones model, the fourth 
column reports that moving from the bottom to the top decile of vega is associated with an 
increase in discretionary accruals of 4.93 (Vega coef 4.93, t-stat 4.00).16 By comparison, the 
average level of discretionary accruals is 12.21 (Table 2, Panel A), and only capital intensity has 
a greater economic impact on discretionary accruals (Capital coef –6.33, t-stat –8.44). Although 
vega is less economically significant in the other two models of discretionary accruals (Vega 
coefs 1.77 and 1.70, t-stats 3.30 and 3.65, respectively), its effect is always among the most 
economically significant.  
 Panel B presents results after including firm fixed effects in the various regression 
specifications (for parsimony, we do not tabulate economic effects). By including firm fixed 
effects, the regression coefficients capture primarily within-firm, time-series variation rather than 
cross-sectional variation. Panel B shows that, considering the incentive effects of portfolio delta 
alone, the relation between Delta and discretionary accruals is not robust to including firm fixed 
effects. In particular, after controlling for firm fixed effects, regardless of the measure of 
discretionary accruals, we find an insignificant relation between Delta and discretionary accruals 
(t-stats of 1.19, 1.28, and 1.34, respectively). These results indicate that variation in portfolio 
                                                 
16
 Recall that discretionary accruals are expressed as a percent of total assets (i.e., 4.93 corresponds to 4.93% of 
total assets). 
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delta explains variation in discretionary accruals across firms, but not variation in discretionary 
accruals within firms. This suggests that the relation between portfolio delta and discretionary 
accruals may be confounded by unobserved, time-invariant firm characteristics that are 
correlated with both portfolio delta and discretionary accruals.  
Regarding portfolio vega, the results in Panel B mirror those in Panel A. Specifically, we 
find that the coefficient on Vega is positive and highly significant across all specifications (t-stats 
of 3.52, 3.57, and 3.45, respectively) and that the coefficient on Vega remains highly statistically 
significant when the incentive effects of portfolio delta and portfolio vega are considered 
simultaneously (t-stats of 3.42, 3.35, and 3.28, respectively). These results suggest that variation 
in risk-taking incentives explains not only variation in discretionary accruals across firms, but 
also time-series variation in discretionary accruals within a firm.  
5.1.2. Risk-taking incentives and restatements 
 Table 4 presents results from using accounting restatements to measure misreporting. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Burns and Kedia, 2006), we find a positive and highly 
significant relation between restatements and Delta (t-stat of 3.52). We also find a positive and 
highly significant relation between restatements and Vega (t-stat of 4.66). However, when the 
incentive effects of portfolio delta and portfolio vega are considered simultaneously in the third 
specification, the relation between Delta and restatements is not statistically significant (t-stat of 
1.31) and the relation between Vega and restatements remains highly statistically significant (t-
stat of 4.23). Consistent with our predictions, these results suggest that the incentive effects of 
portfolio vega on misreporting subsume the incentive effects of portfolio delta.  
 Finally, as with discretionary accruals, the fourth column presents results from estimating 
the probability of restatement as a function of the scaled decile ranks of the independent 
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variables. We estimate this specification using a linear probability model (LPM) so that the 
coefficient on each independent variable represents the increase in the probability of a 
restatement when moving from the bottom decile to the top decile of the respective variable. In 
particular, the estimated coefficient on Vega of 0.03 (t-stat 3.28) indicates that moving from the 
bottom to the top decile of vega increases the probability of restatement by 0.03. By comparison, 
the unconditional probability of a restatement is 0.03 (Table 2, Panel A), and only return-on-
assets (ROA) has a greater economic impact on the probability of restatement (ROA coef –0.04, 
t-stat –2.81).  
 Table 4, Panel B presents results from including firm fixed effects in our regression 
specifications. Panel B shows that, considering the incentive effects of portfolio delta alone, the 
relation between Delta and restatements is not robust to including firm fixed effects. 
Specifically, after including firm fixed effects, we find an insignificant relation between Delta 
and restatements (t-stat of 1.46). This suggests that variation in Delta explains variation in the 
probability of a restatement across firms, but not variation in the probability of a restatement 
within a firm. This indicates that the relation between portfolio delta and restatements may be 
confounded by unobserved, time-invariant firm characteristics that are correlated with portfolio 
delta. Table 4 Panel B also shows that the coefficient on Vega is positive and highly significant 
(t-stat of 4.17) and that the coefficient on Vega remains highly statistically significant when the 
incentive effects of portfolio delta and portfolio vega are considered simultaneously (t-stat of 
3.90). These results suggest that variation in portfolio vega explains not only variation in the 
incidence of accounting restatements across firms, but also time-series variation in the incidence 
of accounting restatements within a firm. 
5.1.3. Risk-taking incentives and SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
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 Table 5 presents results from using AAERs to measure misreporting. Considering the 
incentive effects of portfolio delta and portfolio vega separately, we find a positive and highly 
statistically significant relation between AAERs and Delta (t-stat of 3.22) and AAERs and Vega 
(t-stat of 3.14). However, when the incentive effects of portfolio delta and portfolio vega are 
considered simultaneously, the relation between Delta and restatements is statistically 
insignificant (t-stat of 1.28) and the relation between Vega and restatements remains statistically 
significant (t-stat of 2.65). These results suggest that the incentive effects of portfolio vega on 
misreporting subsume the incentive effects of portfolio delta. In addition, and similar to our 
previous results, the fourth column presents results from estimating the economic significance of 
the variables using a linear probability model (LPM) and the scaled decile ranks of the 
independent variables. We find that the economic magnitude of the effect of Vega on the 
probability of an AAER is large in both relative and absolute terms. Specifically, the estimated 
coefficient on Vega of 0.02 (t-stat 2.40) indicates that moving from the bottom decile of vega to 
the top decile of vega increases the probability of an AAER by 0.02. By comparison, the 
unconditional probability of an AAER is 0.02 (Table 2, Panel A), and no other variable has a 
larger effect on the probability of misreporting.17 
 Table 5, Panel B presents results from including firm fixed effects in our regression 
specifications. Panel B shows that the relation between Delta and AAERs is robust to including 
firm fixed effects. After controlling for firm fixed effects, the coefficient on Delta is positive and 
statistically significant (t-stat of 2.82). Likewise, the coefficient on Vega is also positive and 
statistically significant (t-stat of 3.47). However, when the incentive effects of portfolio delta and 
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 Unlike our estimates of the ranked specifications for the previous measures of accounting manipulation, we 
find that Delta is positive and statistically significant. Although this positive and significant relation is not 
inconsistent with the theoretically ambiguous relationship, it should be interpreted with caution because of all the 
specifications estimated, it is the only specification in which we find a significant relation between Delta and 
misreporting when Vega is also included. 
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portfolio vega are considered simultaneously, the coefficient on Delta is statistically insignificant 
(t-stat of 1.18) and the coefficient on Vega remains statistically significant (t-stat of 2.82). These 
results suggests that variation in portfolio vega explains not only variation in the incidence of 
SEC enforcement releases across firms, but also time-series variation in the incidence of SEC 
enforcement releases within a firm.  
5.2. Matched-sample analysis 
Panel A of Table 6 reports results from comparing the incentives of misreporting firms to 
a size-and-industry matched-sample of non-misreporting firms. When restatements are used as 
the measure of misreporting, we find no difference in mean or median values of Delta across the 
two samples (p-values of 0.37 and 0.87, respectively), but that misreporting firms have 
significantly higher mean and median levels of Vega (p-values of 0.001 and <0.001, 
respectively). When AAERs are used as the measure of misreporting, we again find no 
difference in mean or median values of Delta across the two samples (p-values of 0.87 and 0.97, 
respectively) and that misreporting firms have significantly higher mean and median levels of 
Vega (p-values 0.02 and 0.04 for the difference in means and medians, respectively). 
Collectively, and consistent with Erickson et al. (2006), Efendi et al. (2007), and Armstrong et 
al. (2010), we find no evidence of a relation between portfolio delta and misreporting using these 
matched-sample tests. However, we expand on these studies and additionally consider portfolio 
vega. In contrast to portfolio delta, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between risk-
taking incentives and misreporting.  
Panel B reports results for the propensity-score matched-sample. Panel B presents the 
differences in mean and median values of variables used to estimate the propensity score, the 
observed level of risk-taking incentives, and measures of misreporting between the treatment and 
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matched-sample. Consistent with propensity score matching resulting in covariate balance, and 
hence a successful match, we find a significant difference in the means across treatment and 
matched-samples for only one of 18 variables used to estimate the propensity score (CashComp, 
p-value <0.001) and a significant difference in the median values for only three of the 18 
variables (CashComp, Intangibles, and InterestCov, p-values 0.002, 0.002, and <0.001, 
respectively).18 Moreover, the absolute magnitudes of these mean and median differences are 
quite small. We interpret these results as suggesting that the probability distributions of the 
variables used to construct the matched-sample do not differ significantly across the two 
samples. Thus, the treatment and the matched-samples are very similar along many observed 
attributes including recent stock performance (i.e., Returns).  
 Consistent with the matching algorithm minimizing the difference in propensity score 
while maximizing the difference in Vega, we find highly significant differences in Vega across 
the two samples (p-values <0.001 for both the difference in means and medians). The fact that 
the two samples are similar along so many dimensions, but have dissimilar portfolio vega, 
suggests that any variation in misreporting across the two samples is likely attributable to 
differences in portfolio vega rather than differences in other characteristics.  
 Unlike Armstrong et al. (2010), who use a propensity score matched-sample based on 
portfolio delta and find no evidence of a relation between portfolio delta and either restatements 
or AAERs, we form our matched-sample based on portfolio vega and find a positive relation 
between portfolio vega and discretionary accruals, restatements, and AAERs. Across all four 
measures of discretionary accruals, we find that both the mean and median level of Discretion 
for the treatment firms exceeds those of the matched firms (p-values range from <0.001 to 0.02). 
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 We are unable to attain successful matches for 5% of firms. Accordingly, the resulting sample is reduced 
from 20,445 to 19,418 firm-years. 
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We also find that the probability that the average treatment firm restates is 50% higher than the 
average control firm and that this difference is highly statistically significant (0.03 versus 0.02, 
p-value of 0.004). Similarly, we find that the probability that the average treatment firm is the 
subject of an AAER is 50% higher than the average control firm (0.02 versus 0.01, p-value of 
0.02).19 These results confirm the positive relation between Vega and misreporting documented 
in our regression tests. These results are also consistent with prior studies that find no evidence 
of a relation between Delta and misreporting in matched-samples (e.g., Erickson et al., 2006; 
Efendi et al., 2007; Armstrong et al., 2010). Importantly, the results from our matched-sample 
tests show that examining the relation between equity incentives and misreporting without 
considering risk-taking incentives can lead to the erroneous inference that equity incentives are 
unrelated to misreporting. 
5.3.        Supplemental analyses 
5.3.1. Incremental importance of the CEO´s incentives 
Table 7 presents results from regressing our measures of misreporting on the equity 
incentives of both the CEO and the top management team. Consistent with our earlier results, 
when the CEO’s portfolio delta and portfolio vega are considered simultaneously, we find no 
evidence of a relation between CEODelta and discretionary accruals, restatements, or AAERs (t-
stats of 0.13, 1.14, and 1.28, respectively), and strong evidence of a positive relation between 
CEOVega and all three measures of misreporting (t-stats of 4.66, 3.23, and 2.98, respectively). 
When we include both the CEO’s equity incentives and those of the top management team in the 
specification, we find that the CEO’s portfolio delta and portfolio vega are not incrementally 
associated with misreporting. Instead, we continue to find that the portfolio vega of the top 
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 Because Restatement and AAER are binary variables and have identical medians (i.e., zero), we cannot test for 
a difference in median. 
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management team is positively associated with all three measures of misreporting (t-stats of 
3.35, 3.54, and 2.81, respectively). Because the top management team includes the CEO, these 
results indicate that the CEO’s incentives are not incrementally associated with misreporting. 
This result is consistent with recent findings in the literature regarding the potential complicity of 
other members of the management team in financial misreporting (Jiang et al., 2010). 
5.3.2. Alternative measures of equity incentives 
 To assess the robustness of our results to measurement choices, we repeat our tests using 
alternative measures of equity incentives that are common in the prior literature. Table 8, Panel 
A presents results from scaling portfolio delta and vega by either salary or total cash 
compensation.20 The results in Panel A show that (if anything) ScaledDelta is negatively related 
with misreporting (t-stats range from –3.26 to –0.18). In contrast, we find the coefficient on 
ScaledVega is positive and statistically significant across all specifications (t-stats range from 
2.07 to 4.38). These results suggest that the positive association between Vega and misreporting 
and the lack of an incremental association between Delta and misreporting are not sensitive to 
scale considerations.  
Table 8, Panel B presents results from repeating our tests using five alternative measures of 
equity incentives that are common in the literature. Interestingly, and in contrast to our findings 
for Delta, we find that several of these alternative measures of equity incentives are 
incrementally related to misreporting. For example, we find that the amount of equity pay 
(EquityComp) and the intrinsic value of managers’ option portfolios (Moneyness) are both 
positively related to restatements (t-stats 2.98 and 2.05, respectively) and AAERs (t-stats of 2.52 
and 3.18, respectively). Importantly, the results in Panel B show that, controlling for Vega, the 
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 For the analysis in Table 8, we impose the additional requirement of non-missing values for all alternative 
measures. Since several alternative measures are only defined for variables where the scaler (e.g., salary) is nonzero, 
this requirement drops 19 firm-years from the sample (20,426 from 20,445 firm years).  
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amount of options granted to the top management team during the year (Options) has an 
ambiguous association with misreporting. Specifically, Options is negatively related to 
discretionary accruals (t-stat of –2.14) but positively related to SEC actions (t-stat of 2.07). This 
is consistent with the notion that option grants alone do not encourage misreporting, but rather it 
is the specific terms or parameterization of the option grants that encourage misreporting. 
Finally, across all three measures of misreporting, we continue to find a positive relation between 
Vega and misreporting even after including these alternative measures (t-stats of 4.88, 3.75, and 
2.53, respectively) and no relation between Delta and misreporting (t-stats of –0.61, 1.20, and 
0.50, respectively).  
5.3.3.    Sources of vega 
 Portfolio vega is a function of both the current stock price and features of the option grant 
(e.g., strike price). As a result, changes in stock price subsequent to the option grant may create 
similar variation in both vega and misreporting. For example, a firm may grant executives 
options that are in-the-money at the time of the grant (low vega), but after a subsequent drop in 
stock price, the options may be at-the-money (high vega). In this case, while vega may still 
provide incentives to misreport, variation in these incentives may be related to variation in 
subsequent performance rather than variation in the innate features of the option grant. While we 
control for current stock performance in our regression and matched-sample tests, we conduct 
two additional tests to examine whether the relation between vega and misreporting is coming 
from (a) the component of vega attributable to recent performance or (b) the component of vega 
attributable to features of the grant.  
 First, for each firm, we decompose vega into two components: the component correlated 
with recent performance (VegaPerf) and the component uncorrelated with recent performance 
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(VegaNonPerf).21 Panel A of Table 9 reports results from repeating our tests using these two 
components of vega. We find modest evidence of a positive relation between the component of 
vega that is correlated with firm performance and discretionary accruals, restatements, and 
AAERs (t-stats 2.87, 2.25, and 1.64, respectively), and strong evidence of a positive relation 
between the component of vega that is uncorrelated with firm performance and all three 
measures of misreporting (t-stats 5.04, 4.11, and 2.02, respectively). While variation in firm 
performance can induce variation in vega, variation in vega that is unrelated to recent 
performance appears to have incremental explanatory power for all three measures of 
misreporting. 
Second, we decompose total portfolio vega into the vega from previously granted options 
(VegaOld) and the vega of new options granted during the year (VegaNew).  
  Vega = VegaOld + VegaNew.       (3) 
Since vega is calculated at the end of the fiscal year, we can further decompose the vega of new 
grants into vega on the day of the grant (GrntDtVegaNew), and the change in vega between the 
grant date and the end of the year (ChngVegaNew).22  
  Vega = VegaOld + GrntDtVegaNew + ChngVegaNew.   (4)  
 
Because compensation disclosures prior to 2006 do not provide the grant date of previously 
granted options, we are only able to calculate “grant date vega” for new option grants.23 
Decomposing the vega of new grants into grant date vega and the subsequent change in vega 
                                                 
21
 VegaPerf (VegaNonPerf) is the predicted value (residual) from a firm-specific regression of Vega on Returns. 
We require at least five years of data to estimate the regression, which reduces the sample to 18,405 firm-years. 
22
 VegaNew is the natural logarithm of one plus the vega of option grants during the year, VegaOld is Vega 
minus VegaNew, GrntDtVegaNew is the natural logarithm of one plus the vega of new options granted during the 
year calculated on the grant date, and ChngVegaNew is VegaNew minus GrntDtVegaNew. As with all our incentive 
measures, the components of vegas are averaged across the top five executives.  
23
 Approximately 95% of options are granted at-the-money in the Execucomp database. 
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during the year allows us to separately identify the portion of vega attributable to features of the 
grant from the portion of vega attributable to post-grant stock performance.  
Panel B of Table 9 reports results from repeating our tests using these four components of 
vega. We find a strong positive relation between the vega from new option grants and all three 
measures of misreporting (t-stats 3.90, 4.61, and 2.97, respectively). Decomposing the vega from 
new options, we find a strong positive relation between grant date vega and all three measures of 
misreporting (t-stats 3.87, 4.63, and 3.01, respectively), but no evidence of a relation between the 
change in vega over the year and any measure of misreporting (t-stats 1.09, 1.07, and 1.57, 
respectively). Collectively, these results suggest that the relation between vega and misreporting 
is driven by the component of vega attributable to features of the grant rather than the component 
of vega attributable to firm performance following the grant. 
5.3.4.    The vega-delta incentive wedge 
 Throughout our analyses, we find a positive relation between portfolio vega and various 
measures of misreporting, and that this relation generally subsumes the relation between 
portfolio delta and misreporting. To further explore the result that Vega tends to diminish the 
statistical significance of Delta, we conduct a supplemental analysis in which we identify 
specific observations that are most responsible for driving a “wedge” between the effect of Vega 
and Delta on misreporting. We conduct this analysis by calculating each observation’s influence 
on the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on Vega and Delta. Similar to Belsley, Kuh, and 
Welsch (1980), we begin by defining DFBETAVega (DFBETADelta) for a particular regression 
specification, as the change in coefficient on Vega (Delta) from including that firm-year in the 
regression. The difference between DFBETAVega and DFBETADelta then measures the extent to 
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which each observation accounts for the difference in the effect of Vega and Delta on 
misreporting. We refer to this difference as the “vega-delta wedge.”  
 Table 10 separately reports variable means for observations in the highest percentile of 
the vega-delta wedge and all other observations.24 A few notable patterns emerge from this table. 
First, across all measures of misreporting, the observations that are most responsible for the 
significant positive coefficient on Vega and the insignificant coefficient on Delta have much 
larger discretionary accruals, are more likely to restate their financial reports, and are more likely 
to have an SEC enforcement action brought against them. Second, these observations also 
generally tend to have larger vega (difference in Vega of 0.09, 1.02, and 1.00, respectively) and 
larger delta (difference in Delta –0.04, 0.20, and 0.78, respectively). Importantly, while these 
observations do not have greater equity ownership (difference in Ownership of 0.18, –0.26, and –
0.06, respectively), a significantly greater percentage of their equity portfolio is comprised of 
options (difference in OptionEquityRatio of 0.07, 0.18, and 0.12, respectively). Third, these 
observations also tend to (i) have greater investment opportunities (differences in BM of –0.03, –
0.04, and –0.07, respectively), (ii) be younger (differences in FirmAge of –4.08, –4.81, and –
3.25, respectively), (iii) have lower return-on-assets (differences in ROA of –0.05, 0.00, and –
0.03, respectively), (iv) be less capital intensive (differences in Capital of –0.01, –0.10, and –
0.10, respectively), (v) have higher cash flow volatility (differences in σCFO of 0.01, 0.02, and 
0.01, respectively), and (vi) have higher sales volatility (differences in σSales of 0.02, 0.03, and 
                                                 
24
 Results are similar if we consider observations in the top 5% or top 10% of the vega-delta wedge. The ten 
firms with the largest vega-delta wedge for discretionary accruals are Carmike Cinemas, Collective Brands, 
Covance, Lenox Group, Blockbuster, Westwood One, Barrick Gold, Time Warner, Price Communications, and CPI 
Corp. The ten firms with the largest vega-delta wedge for restatements are Applied Micro Circuits, Catalina 
Marketing, Sourcecop, Epiq Systems, Actel, Duquesne Light, Molex, Conagra Foods, Hain Celestial Group, and 
Altera. The ten firms with the largest vega-delta wedge for AAERs are Black Box, Conagra Foods, Delphi, 
Northwesterm, Hain Celestial, Qwest Communications, Tidewater, Impath, Diebold, and Bristow Group. There is 
minimal overlap in the top ten firms across the three measures of misreporting, which suggests a common set of 
firms is not driving our collective results, and that discretionary accruals, restatements, and SEC enforcement 
actions capture different dimensions, or types of misreporting. 
35 
0.03, respectively). These findings are consistent with prior research on settings where risk-
taking incentives are more prevalent (e.g., Guay, 1999).  
5.3.5. Ability to exit equity positions 
 
 The degree to which equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport may 
also depend on the extent to which managers expect to  “cash out” of their equity portfolios prior 
to the detection of the misreporting (i.e., sell at an inflated stock price). In the extreme, if 
managers do not expect to be able to sell any of their equity holdings prior to detection (e.g., 
managers expect immediate detection), it is unlikely that their equity portfolios would provide 
them with a strong incentive to misreport because they would not expect to benefit from any 
increase in portfolio value. On the other hand, if managers do not expect to get caught, it is 
unclear when they would “cash out.” 
 Prior studies suggest that managers at least partially cash out prior to detection. For 
example, Efendi et al. (2007) find that during years that are subsequently restated, CEOs’ 
proceeds from option exercises are more than nine times higher than those of their counterparts 
at non-restating firms. In addition, Burns and Kedia (2006) find that option exercises by CEOs in 
years that are subsequently restated are negatively related to the subsequent price reaction when 
the restatement is announced. These findings suggest that executives partially divest their 
holdings before misreporting is detected, and that the magnitude of their divesture is related to 
the magnitude of the misreporting (as measured by the stock price reaction).  
 For our sample of restatements, we find that the time between misreporting and detection 
is, on average, 31.5 months (median of 26 months). These statistics suggest that the average 
executive who misreports and subsequently gets caught has time to (at least partially) “cash out” 
at inflated prices. Consistent with prior work, during the period for which financials are 
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misreported, across all measures of misreporting (i.e., discretionary accruals, restatements, and 
AAERs), we find significantly higher levels of option exercise and equity sales at misreporting 
firms. Similar to Efendi et al. (2007), we find that during years that are subsequently restated, the 
average top five executive realizes proceeds from option exercises that are twice that of the 
average top five executive at non-restating firms. In untabulated analysis, we include 
contemporaneous equity sales and option exercise as an additional variable in our misreporting 
regressions, and across all measures of misreporting, we find a positive relation (statistically 
significant at the 5% level for Discretion, 1% level for Restatement, and 10% level for AAER). 
5.3.6. Selection on firm or executive characteristics 
 As with most prior work on incentives, it is difficult to disentangle the effect induced by 
the contract’s incentives and any effects due to innate executive characteristics (e.g., risk 
aversion). For example, prior work has attempted to relate executive characteristics (e.g., 
education, background, and degree of overconfidence) to various firm outcomes. In the specific 
context of financial misreporting, Schrand and Zeckman (2012) argue that overconfident 
managers are inherently more likely to commit fraud. In addition to being inherently more likely 
to commit fraud, it may also be the case that overconfident managers (or managers of some other 
particular characteristic) are more likely to select contracts that provide high risk-taking 
incentives. As a result, the relation between risk-taking incentives and misreporting may be 
confounded by these unobservable executive-specific characteristics.  
We attempt to mitigate this concern in three ways. First, our primary analysis is based on 
the incentives of the top management team rather than the incentives of a particular executive. 
However, it may be the case that selection occurs at the team- or firm-level, such that certain 
firms attract top-level managers that both prefer equity-based pay and are more likely to 
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misreport. Second, our primary regression specifications include firm fixed effects. This within-
firm research design makes it less likely that portfolio delta and vega are capturing some omitted 
firm-specific characteristic that is correlated with both risk-taking incentives and misreporting. 
Third, in untabulated analyses, we estimate our regression tests using only the incentives of the 
CEO, but also include CEO fixed effects. Across all specifications, we find that the positive 
relation between vega and misreporting is robust to including CEO fixed effects, and that the 
positive relation between portfolio delta and misreporting continues to be subsumed by portfolio 
vega. More importantly, this within-executive research design makes it less likely that delta and 
vega are capturing some omitted executive-specific characteristic that explains misreporting. 
Instead, these results suggest that holding the executive constant, temporal variation in risk-
taking incentives explains temporal variation in misreporting. Collectively, these results are 
consistent with risk-taking incentives directly affecting the likelihood of misreporting, and 
mitigate concerns that the positive relation between vega and misreporting is due to selection on 
unobservable firm- or executive-specific characteristics. 
 
6. Conclusion 
A large body of prior literature examines the relation between managerial equity 
incentives and financial misreporting but reports mixed results. This literature argues that a 
manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in stock price has a greater incentive to 
misreport. However, if managers are risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values 
and equity risk, managers face a risk/return tradeoff when making a misreporting decision. In 
this case, the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to changes in stock price, or portfolio delta, will 
have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” 
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In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager’s equity portfolio to changes in risk, or portfolio vega, 
will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. Accordingly, when managers are risk-
averse, it is important to jointly consider both portfolio delta and portfolio vega when assessing 
the relation between equity incentives and misreporting. 
We show that jointly considering both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially 
alters inferences reported in the literature. Specifically, we find inferences in studies reporting 
either a positive relation or no relation between portfolio delta and misreporting are not robust to 
controlling for vega. Using both regression and matching designs, and measuring misreporting 
using discretionary accruals, restatements, and SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between portfolio vega and misreporting 
and that the incentives provided by portfolio vega subsume those of portfolio delta. We continue 
to find a positive relation between vega and misreporting when we include firm fixed effects in 
our regression specifications and no incremental relation between delta and misreporting. This 
suggests that variation in risk-taking incentives explains not only variation in misreporting across 
firms, but also time-series variation in misreporting within a firm.  
 Our results suggest a more nuanced view of equity incentives as they relate to 
misreporting. By explicitly considering the role of risk-taking incentives on the decision to 
misreport, and simultaneously estimating the incentive effects of portfolio delta and vega, our 
results potentially reconcile the conflicting evidence reported in prior studies that focus 
exclusively on portfolio delta. The results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with 
incentives to misreport not because they tie the manager’s wealth to equity value, but because 
they tie the manager’s wealth to equity risk. 
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Appendix A.  
Variable definitions 
 
Dependent variables 
 
Discretion The absolute value of discretionary accruals expressed as a percentage of total assets, calculated 
from one of three models of accruals. The models considered are (1) modified Jones (1991), (2) 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), and (3) McNichols (2002). 
Restatement Equals one if financial results for that year were restated and zero otherwise. We consider only 
restatements related to fraud, misrepresentation, or an investigation by the SEC or PCAOB (e.g., 
Hennes et al., 2008).  
AAER Equals one if the SEC published an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release that identified 
accounting fraud or misrepresentation at the firm that year and zero otherwise.  
 
Incentive variables  
 
CashComp Natural logarithm of one plus the average total cash compensation received by the top five 
executives during the year.  
Delta Natural logarithm of one plus the average sensitivity of the top five executives’ equity portfolio to 
a 1% change in stock price (e.g., Core and Guay, 2002). 
Vega Natural logarithm of one plus the average sensitivity of the top five executives’ equity portfolio to 
a 0.01 change in stock volatility (e.g., Core and Guay, 2002).  
CEOComp Natural logarithm of one plus the total cash compensation received by the CEO during the year.  
CEODelta Natural logarithm of one plus the sensitivity of the CEO’s equity portfolio to a 1% change in stock 
price. 
CEOVega Natural logarithm of one plus the sensitivity of the CEO’s equity portfolio to a 0.01 change in 
volatility. 
ScaledDelta  Sensitivity of the executive’s stock and option portfolio to a 1% change in stock price scaled by 
either salary or total cash compensation for the average top five officer (e.g., Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007). 
ScaledVega  Sensitivity of the executive’s stock and option portfolio to a 0.01 change in volatility scaled by 
either salary or total cash compensation for the average top five officer. 
EquityComp Ratio of the value of stock and options grants to total pay for the average top five officer (e.g., 
Larcker et al., 2007). 
Ownership Number of options, shares of restricted stock, and shares of unrestricted stock held by the average 
top five officer as a percent of shares outstanding (e.g., Cheng and Warfield, 2005). 
Options Number of options granted to the average top five officer during the year as a percent of shares 
outstanding (e.g., Cheng and Farber, 2008). 
Moneyness Value of in-the-money stock options scaled by salary for the average top five officers (e.g., Efendi 
et al., 2007).  
Gamma Natural logarithm of one plus the average sensitivity of the top five executives’ portfolio delta to 
changes in stock price, i.e., second derivative of the Black-Scholes value with respect to stock 
price (e.g., Burns and Kedia, 2006). 
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Appendix A.  
Variable Definitions, (cont’d) 
 
Control variables 
 
Size  Natural logarithm of market value. 
BM  Ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. 
Leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets. 
FirmAge Number of years the firm appears on Compustat. 
Capital  Net plant, property, and equipment scaled by total assets. 
Intangibles Ratio of research and development and advertising expense to sales. 
ROA  Net income scaled by total assets. 
Return  Buy-and-hold returns over the year. 
σCFO  Standard deviation of cash flows from operations over the prior ten years scaled    
  by total assets. 
σSales   Standard deviation of sales over the prior ten years scaled by total assets. 
Acquisition Indicator variable for whether an acquisition accounts for 20% or more    
  of total sales. 
Financing Amount raised from stock and debt issuances during the year scaled by total    
  assets.  
InterestCov Ratio of interest expense to net income. If net income for the year is negative or    
  interest expense is more than twice net income, InterestCov is set to 2. 
SalesGrowth Change in sales scaled by prior-period sales. 
Inventory Inventory scaled by total assets. 
Receivables Accounts receivable scaled by total assets. 
 
Dependent variables are measured at the end of year t, and incentive and control variables are 
measured at the end of year t–1. 
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Table 1  
Summary of prior literature on equity incentives and misreporting 
This table categorizes prior studies on the relation between equity incentives and misreporting. Studies are categorized based on the primary measure of 
equity incentives, the measure of misreporting, the findings, and the type of research design. To be included in the table, the study’s primary focus must be on the 
relation between equity incentives and misreporting and the study must have been published in the Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review 
of Financial Studies, Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting and Economics, or Journal of Accounting Research. δ refers to the sensitivity of the CEO’s 
stock and option portfolio to a 1% change in stock price (e.g., Core and Guay, 2002), Ownership is the number of options, shares of restricted stock, and shares 
of unrestricted stock held by the executive as a percent of shares outstanding, Options is the number of options granted to the executive during the year as a 
percent of shares outstanding, Moneyness is the value of in-the-money stock options scaled by salary, and EquityComp is the value of stock and option grants 
during the year scaled by total pay. Discretionary accruals refers to unsigned discretionary accruals, Restatements refers to whether financial results were 
restated for any reason, and AAER refers to whether an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release identified accounting fraud or misrepresentation at 
the firm. Regression refers to an analysis of an unmatched-sample exclusively. Matching refers to an analysis of a matched-sample.   
 
Paper Primary measure of incentives Measure of misreporting Finding Research design 
Cheng and Warfield (2005) Ownership Discretion Positive relation Regression 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) δ Discretion Positive relation Regression 
Burns and Kedia (2006) δ Restatement Positive relation Regression 
Erickson et al. (2006) δ AAER No relation Matching 
Efendi et al. (2007) Moneyness Restatements Positive relation Matching 
Larcker et al. (2007) EquityComp Discretion, Restatements No relation Regression 
Cheng and Farber (2008) Options Restatements Positive relation Regression 
Cornett et al. (2008) EquityComp Discretion Positive relation Regression 
Armstrong et al. (2010) δ Litigation, Restatements, AAERs No relation Matching 
Jiang et al. (2010) δ Discretion No relation CEO  
Positive CFO 
Regression 
Feng et al. (2011) δ AAER Positive CEO 
No relation CFO 
Matching 
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for firms in our sample. Our sample is constructed from the intersection 
of Execucomp (compensation), CRSP/Compustat (accounting and stock price data), AuditAnalytics (data on 
restatements), and the Center for Financial Reporting and Management (data on SEC Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases) for the time period 1992 to 2009 and covers a total of 20,445 firm-years (2,446 firms). Panel 
A reports descriptive statistics for measures of misreporting. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for selected firm 
characteristics. Panel C reports the distribution of the incentive variables used in our analysis. Panel D compares the 
mean and median values of incentive variables for the full sample to those of the sample of firms who restated their 
financials (Restatement=1) and were subject to an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER=1). 
p-values test for a difference in means (medians) between the full sample and the restatement sample, and the full 
sample and the AAER sample. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Measures of misreporting 
Variable Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
Discretion 
(Modified Jones) 12.21 12.92 3.10 7.86 17.46 
Discretion 
(Dechow and Dichev) 7.76 8.76 2.02 4.84 10.25 
Discretion 
(McNichols) 7.74 8.91 1.97 4.69 10.10 
Restatement 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AAER 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Variable Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
Size 7.27 1.57 6.18 7.14 8.28 
BM 0.50 0.43 0.25 0.42 0.63 
Leverage 0.52 0.21 0.37 0.53 0.66 
FirmAge 26.08 16.41 11.00 22.00 42.00 
ROA 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.09 
Returns 0.14 0.57 ‒0.17 0.08 0.34 
Capital 0.32 0.23 0.13 0.26 0.47 
Intangibles 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.06 
σCFO 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.07 
σSales 0.22 0.18 0.10 0.16 0.27 
Financing 0.11 0.17 0.01 0.04 0.13 
Acquisition 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
InterestCov 0.67 0.76 0.07 0.30 1.14 
SalesGrowth 0.14 0.31 0.01 0.09 0.21 
Inventory 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.17 
Receivables 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.20 
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics (cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Incentives variables 
Variable Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
CashComp 6.29 0.59 5.86 6.25 6.66 
Delta 4.46 1.44 3.51 4.44 5.41 
Vega 2.96 1.37 2.06 2.98 3.89 
CEOCashComp 6.76 0.77 6.29 6.75 7.23 
CEODelta 5.24 1.67 4.22 5.25 6.30 
CEOVega 3.46 1.72 2.49 3.65 4.65 
EquityComp 0.43 0.39 0.18 0.37 0.59 
Ownership 1.34 1.80 0.30 0.70 1.51 
Options 0.11 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.14 
Moneyness 9.97 28.94 0.49 2.74 8.99 
Gamma 1.91 1.19 1.05 1.78 2.63 
 
Panel D: Differences in incentives 
 
Full Sample 
(N=20,445) 
 Restatement Sample 
(Restatement =1, N=568)  
AAER Sample 
(AAER=1, N=361) 
Variable Mean Median  Mean p Median p  Mean p Median p 
CashComp 6.29 6.25  6.43 <0.01 6.38 <0.01  6.54 <0.01 6.46 <0.01 
Delta 4.46 4.44  4.96 <0.01 4.85 <0.01  5.32 <0.01 5.20 <0.01 
Vega 2.96 2.98  3.59 <0.01 3.58 <0.01  3.81 <0.01 3.82 <0.01 
CEOCashComp 6.76 6.75  6.87 <0.01 6.85 <0.01  7.03 <0.01 7.01 <0.01 
CEODelta 5.24 5.25  5.75 <0.01 5.74 <0.01  6.21 <0.01 6.08 <0.01 
CEOVega 3.46 3.65  4.15 <0.01 4.29 <0.01  4.31 <0.01 4.48 <0.01 
EquityComp 0.43 0.37  0.63 <0.01 0.53 <0.01  0.70 <0.01 0.58 <0.01 
Ownership 1.34 0.70  1.31 0.66 0.94 <0.01  1.35 0.86 0.82 0.05 
Options 0.11 0.06  0.15 <0.01 0.09 <0.01  0.16 <0.01 0.08 <0.01 
Moneyness 9.97 2.74  23.93 <0.01 7.17 <0.01  33.23 <0.01 10.52 <0.01 
Gamma 1.91 1.78  2.05 <0.01 1.93 <0.01  2.18 <0.01 1.97 <0.01 
47 
Table 3  
Risk-taking incentives and discretionary accruals 
This table presents results from estimating discretionary accruals (Discretion) as a function of equity incentives and control variables. Panel A presents 
results from a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, and Panel B presents results including firm fixed effects. All variables are as defined in Appendix 
A. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. Sample includes 20,445 firm-years. Sample descriptive characteristics are found in Table 2.   
 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
 Modified Jones (1991) Dechow and Dichev (2002) McNichols (2002) 
Variable 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
Ranks 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
Ranks 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
Ranks 
             
Incentive variables            
CashComp 0.85
*
 0.15 0.19 0.69 0.29 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.29 0.02 0.03 0.15 
 (1.78) (0.39) (0.48) (0.94) (1.05) (0.10) (0.12) (0.27) (1.05) (0.07) (0.12) (0.37) 
Delta 0.28
***
  –0.14 –0.05 0.13
**
  –0.01 –0.40 0.09 . –0.05 –0.48 
 (2.97)  (–0.83) (–0.06) (1.96)  (–0.18) (–1.05) (1.23) . (–0.82) (–1.36) 
Vega . 1.31
***
 1.35
***
 4.93
***
 . 0.50
***
 0.50
***
 1.77
***
 . 0.49
***
 0.50
***
 1.70
***
 
 . (4.60) (4.40) (4.00) . (4.22) (4.12) (3.30) . (4.28) (4.45) (3.65) 
            
Control variables            
Size 0.09 –0.36
*
 –0.32 –2.19
**
 0.10 –0.05 –0.05 –0.55 0.12 –0.05 –0.03 –0.50 
 (0.51) (–1.66) (–1.61) (–2.36) (1.09) (–0.52) (–0.48) (–1.09) (1.10) (–0.48) (–0.28) (–0.99) 
BM –0.52 –0.64 –0.70
*
 –2.41
***
 –0.12 –0.17 –0.18 –1.86
***
 –0.38 –0.43 –0.45 –2.16
***
 
 (–1.12) (–1.57) (–1.66) (–2.98) (–0.45) (–0.65) (–0.65) (–4.59) (–1.29) (–1.49) (–1.52) (–5.12) 
Leverage –1.68
*
 –1.94
**
 –2.07
**
 –2.03
***
 –1.60
***
 –1.42
***
 –1.43
***
 –1.28
***
 –1.23
**
 –1.30
***
 –1.34
***
 –1.18
***
 
 (–1.85) (–2.19) (–2.38) (–3.28) (–2.58) (–2.74) (–2.78) (–4.20) (–2.46) (–2.69) (–2.72) (–4.22) 
FirmAge –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 0.41 –0.03
***
 –0.03
***
 –0.03
***
 –0.78
**
 –0.03
***
 –0.02
***
 –0.02
***
 –0.66
**
 
 (–1.17) (–0.83) (–1.01) (0.84) (–4.44) (–4.33) (–4.31) (–2.48) (–4.24) (–4.10) (–4.18) (–1.99) 
ROA –11.20
***
 –10.43
***
 –10.34
***
 –3.63
***
 –6.89
***
 –6.61
***
 –6.60
***
 –1.40
***
 –8.56
***
 –8.25
***
 –8.21
***
 –1.77
***
 
 (–4.59) (–4.80) (–4.77) (–4.25) (–5.11) (–5.00) (–4.97) (–4.10) (–5.90) (–6.20) (–6.13) (–6.27) 
Returns –0.36 –0.01 0.03 –1.23 0.10 0.23 0.24 –0.73 –0.01 0.12 0.13 –0.89
**
 
 (–0.53) (–0.01) (0.04) (–0.95) (0.35) (0.89) (0.91) (–1.55) (–0.02) (0.53) (0.59) (–2.07) 
Capital –10.59
***
 –9.80
***
 –9.85
***
 –6.33
***
 –2.19
***
 –1.89
***
 –1.90
***
 –1.17
***
 –2.70
***
 –2.41
***
 –2.43
***
 –1.56
***
 
 (–12.26) (–10.16) (–10.45) (–8.44) (–3.77) (–3.32) (–3.39) (–2.90) (–6.16) (–5.88) (–5.99) (–4.50) 
Intangibles –0.43 –1.25 –1.27 1.27
*
 2.05 1.77 1.77 0.83
**
 1.08 0.71 0.71 0.89
***
 
 (–0.21) (–0.66) (–0.67) (1.77) (1.30) (1.15) (1.15) (2.53) (0.69) (0.47) (0.47) (2.77) 
σCFO 16.26
***
 14.86
***
 14.74
***
 2.94
***
 23.99
***
 23.44
***
 23.43
***
 4.08
***
 26.08
***
 25.68
***
 25.62
***
 4.32
***
 
 (3.57) (3.43) (3.40) (5.60) (7.49) (7.49) (7.48) (12.65) (9.05) (9.18) (9.15) (12.62) 
σSales –0.37 –0.39 –0.35 –0.64 –0.25 –0.21 –0.21 –0.42 0.08 0.07 0.10 –0.43 
 (–0.39) (–0.40) (–0.36) (–0.98) (–0.49) (–0.42) (–0.41) (–1.35) (0.15) (0.15) (0.20) (–1.39) 
R
2 
(%) 10.04 11.39 11.40 11.60 9.67 10.15 10.15 9.00 10.63 11.05 11.06 9.95 
48 
Table 3 
Risk-Taking incentives and discretionary accruals (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Firm fixed effects 
 Modified Jones (1991) Dechow and Dichev (2002) McNichols (2002) 
Variable 
(1) 
Fixed 
effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
effects 
(3) 
Fixed 
effects 
(1) 
Fixed 
effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
effects 
(3) 
Fixed 
effects 
(1) 
Fixed 
effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
effects 
(3) 
Fixed 
effects 
          
Incentive variables         
          
CashComp 2.08
**
 1.66
**
 1.65
**
 0.91
**
 0.76
**
 0.75
**
 1.13
**
 0.99
**
 0.97
**
 
 (2.44) (2.22) (2.19) (2.31) (2.08) (2.07) (2.60) (2.41) (2.37) 
Delta 0.49 . 0.03 0.26 . 0.09 0.32 . 0.15 
 (1.19) . (0.17) (1.28) . (0.66) (1.34) . (1.30) 
Vega . 1.32
***
 1.31
***
 . 0.52
***
 0.49
***
 . 0.52
***
 0.48
***
 
 . (3.52) (3.42) . (3.57) (3.35) . (3.45) (3.28) 
          
Control variables         
          
Size –0.96
*
 –1.20
***
 –1.12
**
 –0.25 –0.29 –0.34 –0.33 –0.32 –0.42 
 (–1.76) (–2.16) (–2.31) (–0.69) (–0.82) (–1.01) (–0.84) (–0.86) (–1.14) 
BM –0.09 –0.25 –0.24 0.59 0.52 0.53 0.35 0.27 0.29 
 (–0.10) (–0.33) (–0.32) (1.14) (1.04) (1.05) (0.67) (0.53) (0.58) 
Leverage 2.72
**
 2.46
*
 2.46
*
 0.48 0.37 0.37 0.78 0.68 0.68 
 (1.80) (1.66) (1.65) (0.53) (0.42) (0.42) (0.85) (0.75) (0.75) 
FirmAge 0.74
***
 0.67
***
 0.67
***
 0.30
***
 0.28
***
 0.28
***
 0.30
***
 0.27
***
 0.28
***
 
 (4.66) (4.57) (4.63) (4.67) (4.34) (4.46) (4.38) (3.94) (4.10) 
ROA –7.40
**
 –7.24
***
 –7.24
***
 –5.19
***
 –5.11
***
 –5.13
***
 –6.25
***
 –6.16
***
 –6.20
***
 
 (–3.03) (–3.01) (–3.01) (–2.75) (–2.73) (–2.76) (–3.56) (–3.53) (–3.57) 
Returns 0.46 0.76 0.75 0.38
**
 0.51
***
 0.49
***
 0.25 0.38
**
 0.35
**
 
 (0.62) (1.23) (1.20) (2.29) (3.39) (3.24) (1.57) (2.62) (2.38) 
Capital –5.15
*
 –4.87
***
 –4.86
***
 –1.52 –1.44 –1.41 –2.07 –2.02 –1.96 
 (–2.97) (–2.77) (–2.78) (–1.01) (–0.99) (–0.97) (–1.28) (–1.28) (–1.24) 
Intangibles –0.81 –0.92 –0.93 1.09 1.08 1.05 –0.29 –0.28 –0.33 
 (–0.43) (–0.48) (–0.48) (0.46) (0.45) (0.44) (–0.12) (–0.12) (–0.14) 
σCFO 0.93 1.72 1.68 11.43
*
 11.83
*
 11.71
*
 10.56 11.06
*
 10.86
*
 
 (0.12) (0.28) (0.27) (1.82) (1.88) (1.87) (1.61) (1.68) (1.65) 
σSales 3.77
***
 3.42
**
 3.41
**
 1.41
*
 1.31
*
 1.28
*
 1.79
**
 1.72
**
 1.66
**
 
 (2.68) (2.44) (2.40) (1.84) (1.70) (1.68) (2.26) (2.14) (2.09) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2 
(%) 40.26 40.64 40.64 38.27 38.39 38.39 37.26 37.36 37.37 
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Table 4  
Risk-taking incentives and restatements 
This table presents results from estimating a probit model of the likelihood of an accounting restatement 
(Restatement) as a function of equity incentives and control variables. Panel A presents results from a pooled 
regression using either a probit model or a linear probability model (LPM), and Panel B presents results after 
including firm fixed effects. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are 
based on standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. Sample includes 20,445 firm-years. Sample descriptive characteristics are found 
in Table 2. 
 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
Variable 
(1) 
Probit 
(2) 
Probit 
(3) 
Probit 
(4) 
LPM 
w/ ranks 
     
Incentive variables     
     
CashComp 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.01 
 (1.57) (0.95) (0.89) (0.82) 
Delta 0.08
***
 . 0.04 0.01 
 (3.52) . (1.31) (1.32) 
Vega . 0.19
***
 0.18
***
 0.03
***
 
 . (4.66) (4.23) (3.28) 
     
Control variables     
     
Size 0.02 –0.03 –0.04 0.00 
 (0.61) (–0.55) (–0.85) (–0.07) 
BM 0.19
**
 0.18
**
 0.19
**
 0.00 
 (2.30) (2.02) (2.18) (0.18) 
Leverage 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.00 
 (0.64) (0.62) (0.73) (0.10) 
FirmAge –0.01
***
 –0.01
***
 –0.01
***
 –0.03
***
 
 (–3.96) (–4.14) (–3.92) (–2.86) 
ROA 0.03 –0.04 –0.05 –0.04
***
 
 (–0.12) (–0.16) (–0.20) (–2.81) 
Returns 0.08
*
 0.13
***
 0.12
***
 0.01 
 (1.72) (3.04) (2.86) (0.61) 
Capital –0.94
***
 –0.87
***
 –0.86
***
 –0.03
***
 
 (–4.45) (–4.08) (–4.06) (–2.59) 
Intangibles 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.01 
 (0.76) (0.19) (0.23) (0.67) 
Financing –0.03 –0.02 –0.03 0.01
*
 
 (–0.16) (–0.13) (–0.21) (1.65) 
Acquisition 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 
 (0.21) (0.60) (0.54) (–0.17) 
InterestCov 0.16
***
 0.14
***
 0.14
***
 –0.01 
 (3.43) (2.90) (2.91) (–0.46) 
R
2 
(%) 6.43 7.50 7.55 1.76 
 
 
50 
 
Table 4 
Risk-taking incentives and restatements (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Firm fixed effects 
Variable 
(1) 
Fixed effects 
(2) 
Fixed effects 
(3) 
Fixed effects 
    
Incentive variables    
    
CashComp 0.03
***
 0.02
***
 0.02
***
 
 (4.63) (4.43) (4.44) 
Delta 0.004 . 0.001 
 (1.46) . (0.28) 
Vega . 0.01
***
 0.01
***
 
 . (4.17) (3.90) 
    
Control variables    
    
Size 0.01
***
 0.01
***
 0.01
**
 
 (2.85) (2.90) (2.54) 
BM 0.03
***
 0.03
***
 0.03
***
 
 (2.88) (2.85) (2.88) 
Leverage 0.04
*
 0.04
*
 0.04
*
 
 (1.85) (1.80) (1.80) 
FirmAge –0.003
**
 –0.003
***
 –0.003
***
 
 (–2.42) (–2.88) (–2.98) 
ROA 0.04
*
 –0.04
**
 –0.04
**
 
 (–1.94) (–2.05) (–2.05) 
Returns 0.01 0.01
*
 0.01
*
 
 (1.00) (1.74) (1.73) 
Capital –0.03 –0.03 –0.03 
 (–1.00) (–0.94) (–0.93) 
Intangibles 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.69) (0.67) (0.66) 
Financing –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 
 (–0.24) (–0.18) (–0.19) 
Acquisition 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.15) 
InterestCov 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (1.43) (1.12) (1.13) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R
2 
(%) 46.19 46.31 46.31 
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Table 5  
Risk-taking incentives and SEC Enforcement Releases 
This table presents results from estimating the likelihood of an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Release (AAER) as a function of equity incentives and control variables. Panel A presents results from a pooled 
regression, and Panel B presents results after including firm fixed effects. All variables are as defined in Appendix 
A. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. Sample includes 20,445 firm-years. 
Sample descriptive characteristics are found in Table 2. 
 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
Variable 
(1)  
Probit 
(2) 
Probit 
(3) 
Probit 
(4) 
LPM w/ ranks 
     
Incentive variables     
     
CashComp –0.03 –0.07 –0.09 0.00 
 (–0.28) (–0.64) (–0.81) (–0.41) 
Delta 0.10
***
 . 0.07 0.01
**
 
 (3.22) . (1.28) (2.22) 
Vega . 0.15
***
 0.13
***
 0.02
**
 
 . (3.14) (2.65) (2.40) 
     
Control variables     
     
Size 0.13
***
 0.11
**
 0.09
*
 0.02
*
 
 (2.76) (2.31) (1.71) (1.93) 
BM 0.26
***
 0.22
**
 0.25
***
 0.00 
 (3.21) (2.63) (3.05) (–0.17) 
Leverage 0.55
***
 0.48
**
 0.53
***
 0.01 
 (2.89) (2.39) (2.77) (0.82) 
FirmAge –0.01
***
 –0.01
***
 –0.01
***
 –0.01
**
 
 (–2.59) (–3.00) (–2.56) (–2.10) 
ROA –0.74
***
 –0.71
***
 –0.72
***
 –0.02
***
 
 (–3.00) (–2.80) (–2.88) (–3.27) 
Returns 0.04 0.09
**
 0.07
**
 0.00 
 (1.04) (2.32) (2.00) (–0.37) 
Capital –0.83
***
 –0.76
***
 –0.73
***
 –0.02
*
 
 (–3.03) (–2.70) (–2.65) (–1.87) 
Intangibles –0.40 –0.51 –0.48 –0.01 
 (–1.26) (–1.53) (–1.43) (–0.82) 
Financing –0.37
**
 –0.38
**
 –0.40
**
 0.00 
 (–2.14) (–2.19) (–2.33) (0.29) 
Acquisition 0.22
**
 0.22
**
 0.23
**
 0.01 
 (2.02) (2.06) (2.10) (1.51) 
SalesGrowth 0.20
***
 0.24
***
 0.22
***
 0.01
*
 
 (3.44) (4.20) (3.80) (1.72) 
Inventory –0.22 –0.10 –0.13 0.00 
 (–0.56) (–0.25) (–0.33) (–0.63) 
Receivables 0.54 0.67 0.69
*
 0.01
**
 
 (1.32) (1.60) (1.66) (1.96) 
R
2 
(%) 8.28 8.80 8.99 1.53 
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Table 5  
Risk-taking incentives and SEC Enforcement Releases (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Firm fixed effects 
 
(1) 
Fixed effects 
(2) 
Fixed effects 
(3) 
Fixed effects 
    
Incentive variables    
    
CashComp 0.01 0.01 0.003 
 (0.99) (0.85) (0.66) 
Delta 0.01 . 0.004 
 (2.82) . (1.18) 
Vega . 0.01
***
 0.01
***
 
 . (3.47) (2.82) 
    
Control variables    
    
Size 0.01
**
 0.01
***
 0.01
**
 
 (2.45) (3.26) (2.25) 
BM 0.02
**
 0.02
**
 0.02
**
 
 (2.60) (2.49) (2.60) 
Leverage 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (1.35) (1.19) (1.23) 
FirmAge –0.003
***
 –0.004
***
 –0.004
***
 
 (–4.48) (–4.84) (–4.84) 
ROA –0.03
*
 –0.03
*
 –0.03
*
 
 (–1.80) (–1.74) (–1.79) 
Returns –0.003
*
 0.0001 –0.001 
 (–1.79) (0.03) (–0.89) 
Capital –0.04 –0.04
*
 –0.04 
 (–1.60) (–1.64) (–1.53) 
Intangibles 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.76) (0.98) (0.75) 
Financing –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 
 (–1.20) (–1.07) (–1.14) 
Acquisition 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.89) (0.89) (0.89) 
SalesGrowth 0.01 0.01
*
 0.01
*
 
 (1.57) (1.94) (1.76) 
Inventory –0.03 –0.02 –0.02 
 (–0.96) (–0.68) (–0.73) 
Receivables 0.05 0.06 0.06 
 (1.39) (1.52) (1.48) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R
2 
(%) 42.85 42.86 42.95 
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Table 6  
Matched-samples 
This table presents results from utilizing two matched-pair designs. In Panel A, misreporting firms are matched 
to non-misreporting firms based on industry and total assets. Tabulated statistics test for a difference in CashComp, 
Delta, and Vega between the two samples. In Panel B, firms are matched based on a vector of control variables 
using propensity score matching. In Panel B, one-to-one matched-pairs are formed by estimating a propensity score 
as a function of control variables and minimizing the differences in propensity scores and maximizing the 
differences in Vega. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. p-values (two-tail) appear in brackets and are based 
on standard errors clustered by firm and year . 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels (two-tail), respectively.  Sample descriptive characteristics are found in Table 2. 
 
Panel A: Industry and size matched sample 
 
Matching on restatement 
 
Misreporting firms 
(N=568) 
Size & industry 
matched sample 
(N=568) 
 
Difference in means 
 
Difference in 
medians 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median  Diff. p-value  Diff. p-value 
CashComp 6.43 6.38 6.32 6.26  0.11
**
 [0.04]  0.12
*
 [0.08] 
Delta 4.96 4.84 4.84 4.86  0.12 [0.37]  –0.02 [0.87] 
Vega 3.59 3.58 3.19 3.18  0.40
***
 [0.001]  0.40
***
 [<0.001] 
 
Matching on AAER 
 
Misreporting firms 
(N=361) 
Size & industry 
matched sample 
(N=361) 
 
Difference in means 
 
Difference in 
medians 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median  Diff. p-value  Diff. p-value 
CashComp 6.53 6.46 6.52 6.46  0.01 [0.87]  0.003 [0.97] 
Delta 5.11 5.20 4.99 5.02  0.12 [0.40]  0.18 [0.30] 
Vega 3.80 3.82 3.48 3.43  0.32
**
 [0.02]  0.39
**
 [0.04] 
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Table 6  
Matched-samples (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Propensity score matched sample 
 
 
Treatment 
sample 
(N=9,709) 
Propensity score 
matched sample 
(N=9,709) 
 
Difference in means 
 
Difference in 
medians 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median  Diff. p-value  Diff. p-value 
           
Variables used to estimate the propensity score       
           
Size 7.20 7.09 7.20 7.09  0.00 [0.98]  0.00 [0.94] 
BM 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.41  0.00 [0.99]  0.01 [0.36] 
Leverage 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.53  0.00 [0.73]  –0.01 [0.38] 
FirmAge 25.76 21.00 25.97 22.00  –0.21 [0.73]  –1.00 [0.35] 
ROA 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05  0.00 [0.72]  0.00 [0.60] 
Returns 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.09  0.00 [0.84]  –0.03 [0.21] 
Capital 0.32 0.25 0.32 0.26  0.00 [0.88]  –0.01 [0.27] 
Intangibles 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.01  0.00 [0.94]  0.01
***
 [0.002] 
σCFO 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04  0.00 [0.86]  0.00 [0.24] 
σSales 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.17  0.00 [0.72]  0.00 [0.33] 
Financing 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.04  0.00 [0.98]  0.00 [0.70] 
Acquisition 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00  0.00 [0.63]  0.00 NA 
InterestCov 0.68 0.30 0.67 0.30  0.01 [0.85]  0.00 [0.99] 
SalesGrowth 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.10  0.00 [0.97]  –0.01
***
 [0.002] 
Inventory 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09  0.00 [0.89]  0.00 [0.98] 
Receivables 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.13  0.00 [0.56]  0.00 [0.54] 
CashComp 6.34 6.29 6.22 6.18  0.12
***
 [<0.001]  0.11
***
 [<0.001] 
Delta 4.41 4.44 4.36 4.38  0.05 [0.16]  0.06 [0.41] 
           
Risk-taking incentives         
           
Vega 3.55 3.49 2.31 2.30  1.24
***
 [<0.001]  1.19
***
 [<0.001] 
           
Misreporting variables          
           
Discretion 
(Modified Jones) 13.03 8.99 11.18 6.84 
 
1.85
***
 [<0.001] 
 
2.15
***
 [<0.001] 
Discretion 
(Dechow-Dichev) 8.10 5.20 7.29 4.43 
 
0.81
***
 [0.001] 
 
0.77
***
 [<0.001] 
Discretion 
(McNichols) 8.06 5.00 7.27 4.30 
 
0.79
***
 [0.002] 
 
0.70
***
 [0.001] 
Restatement 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00  0.01
***
 [0.004]  0.00 NA 
AAER 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00  0.01
**
 [0.02]  0.00 NA 
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Table 7  
Incremental importance of the CEO’s incentives 
This table presents results from estimating various measures of misreporting as a function of the equity 
incentives of the CEO, the top management team (including the CEO), and control variables. For parsimony, 
coefficients on control variables are not tabulated. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. t-statistics appear in 
parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. Sample includes 20,445 firm-years. Sample descriptive 
characteristics are found in Table 2. 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Discretion 
(Modified Jones) 
 
Restatement 
 
AAER 
          
          
CEO incentive variables 
          
          
CEOCashComp  –0.30 –0.76
***
  0.04 0.01  0.02 0.18 
  (–1.37) (–3.10)  (0.74) (0.23)  (0.28) (1.55) 
CEODelta  0.01 0.01  0.03 –0.03  0.05 0.08 
  (0.13) (0.05)  (1.14) (–1.04)  (1.28) (1.08) 
CEOVega  0.84
***
 0.01  0.10
***
 –0.01  0.05
***
 –0.05 
  (4.66) (0.03)  (3.23) (–0.12)  (2.98) (–1.48) 
  
        
Top management team incentive variables  
          
          
CashComp  . 1.09
**
  . 0.08  . –0.29 
  . (1.99)  . (0.63)  . (–1.59) 
Delta  . –0.19  . 0.07  . –0.02 
  . (–0.90)  . (1.26)  . (–0.25) 
Vega  . 1.36
***
  . 0.18
***
  . 0.20
***
 
  . (3.35)  . (3.54)  . (2.81) 
          
          
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R
2 
(%)  11.05 11.48  6.91 7.58  8.71 9.37 
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Table 8  
Alternative portfolio sensitivity and equity incentive measures 
This table presents results from estimating various measures of misreporting as a function of alternative 
measures of equity incentives used in the literature and control variables. Panel A presents results from deflating the 
Core and Guay (2002) delta (vega) by salary and separately by cash compensation (ScaledDelta, ScaledVega). Panel 
B presents results from measuring equity incentives using five alternatives measures of equity incentives: the ratio 
of equity-based pay to total pay (EquityComp), equity ownership (Ownership), the number of options granted during 
the year scaled by shares outstanding (Options), the moneyness of in-the-money options (Moneyness), and the 
sensitivity of portfolio delta to changes in stock price (Gamma). For parsimony, coefficients on control variables are 
not tabulated. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels (two-tail), respectively.  Sample includes 20,426 firm-years with non-missing values of all alternative equity 
incentives measures. Sample descriptive characteristics are found in Table 2. 
 
Panel A: Alternative portfolio sensitivity measures 
  
Discretion 
(Modified Jones) 
 
Restatement 
 
AAER 
Variable  
Scaled by 
salary 
Scaled by 
cash comp.  
Scaled by 
salary 
Scaled by 
cash comp.  
Scaled by 
salary 
Scaled by 
cash comp. 
          
          
CashComp  0.82
*
 1.42
***
  0.19
**
 0.26
***
  0.01 0.06 
  (1.85) (2.79)  (1.96) (2.68)  (0.07) (0.63) 
ScaledDelta  –0.40
***
 –0.44
**
  –0.01 –0.01  –0.01 –0.01 
  (–3.26) (–2.34)  (–0.55) (–0.28)  (–0.33) (–0.18) 
ScaledVega  10.42
***
 18.24
***
  0.83
***
 1.46
***
  0.60
**
 1.06
**
 
  (4.26) (4.38)  (3.75) (3.82)  (2.21) (2.07) 
          
          
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R
2 
(%)  11.14 11.26  6.95 6.90  8.28 8.28 
 
Panel B: Alternative measures of equity incentives 
Variable  
Discretion 
(Modified Jones) 
 
Restatement 
 
AAER 
          
          
CashComp  1.24
**
 0.41  0.25
***
 0.16  0.03 –0.02 
  (2.40) (1.02)  (2.60) (1.58)  (0.26) (–0.22) 
EquityComp  1.49
**
 0.47  0.25
***
 0.20
***
  0.25
***
 0.22
**
 
  (2.30) (0.95)  (3.46) (2.98)  (2.76) (2.52) 
Ownership  0.01 0.07  –0.02 –0.08  0.03 0.02 
  (0.06) (0.59)  (–1.06) (–1.03)  (1.27) (0.38) 
Options  –0.32 –2.45
**
  0.06 –0.18  0.47
***
 0.35
**
 
  (–0.29) (–2.14)  (0.54) (–1.38)  (3.05) (2.07) 
Moneyness  0.0001 –0.0001  0.002
**
 0.002
**
  0.002
***
 0.002
***
 
  (0.01) (–0.01)  (2.32) (2.05)  (3.40) (3.18) 
Gamma  –0.18 –0.51  –0.02 –0.07  –0.01 –0.03 
  (–1.03) (–1.41)  (–0.52) (–1.56)  (–0.23) (–0.62) 
Delta   –0.13   0.14   0.03 
   (–0.61)   (1.20)   (0.50) 
Vega   1.75
***
   0.18
***
   0.10
**
 
   (4.88)   (3.75)   (2.53) 
          
          
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R
2 
(%)  10.21 11.97  7.09 7.23  9.86 9.98 
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Table 9  
Sources of vega 
This table presents results from decomposing vega into various components. Panel A present results from 
decomposing vega into the portion correlated with recent stock performance, and the portion uncorrelated with 
recent stock performance. VegaPerf (VegaNonPerf) is the predicted value (residual) from a regression of Vega on 
Returns, estimated for each firm with at least five years of data. Panel B presents results from decomposing total 
portfolio vega (Vega) into vega from existing option holdings (VegaOld) and vega from option grants during the 
year (VegaNew), and further decomposing vega from option grants during the year into the vega of option grants on 
the day of the grant (GrntDtVegaNew), and the change in vega between the grant date and the end of the year 
(ChngVegaNew). VegaNew is the natural logarithm of one plus the sensitivity of options granted to the top five 
executives in the current year to a 0.01 change in stock volatility, VegaOld is Vega minus VegaNew, 
GrntDtVegaNew is the natural logarithm of one plus the sensitivity of options granted to the top five executives in 
the current year to a 0.01 change in stock volatility calculated using stock price on each grant date, and 
ChngVegaNew is VegaNew minus GrntDtVegaNew. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. For 
parsimony, coefficients on control variables are not tabulated. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels (two-tail), respectively. Sample includes 18,405 firm-years in Panel A and 20,445 firm-years in Panel B.  
 
Panel A: Performance-related vega 
 
Variable 
 
 
Discretion 
(Modified Jones) 
 
Restatement 
 
AAER 
       
       
CashComp  0.30  0.08  –0.08 
  (0.82)  (0.72)  (–0.74) 
Delta  –0.24  0.04  0.07 
  (–1.44)  (1.31)  (1.34) 
VegaPerf  0.70
***
  0.14
**
  0.11
*
 
  (2.87)  (2.25)  (1.64) 
VegaNonPerf  2.35
***
  0.21
***
  0.15
***
 
  (5.04)  (4.11)  (2.02) 
       
       
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2 
(%)  12.79  7.95  9.60 
 
Panel B: Vega from current year grants 
Variable 
 
Discretion 
(Modified Jones) 
 
Restatement 
 
AAER 
          
          
CashComp  0.19 0.19  0.09 0.09  –0.09 –0.09 
  (0.49) (0.47)  (0.84) (0.83)  (–0.87) (–0.89) 
Delta  –0.16 –0.16  0.03 0.03  0.07 0.07 
  (–0.96) (–0.97)  (1.22) (1.21)  (1.32) (1.30) 
VegaOld  1.78
***
 1.77
***
  0.17
***
 0.17
***
  0.08 0.08 
  (4.80) (4.88)  (3.63) (3.64)  (1.58) (1.51) 
VegaNew  1.17
***
   0.20
***
   0.16
***
  
  (3.90)   (4.61)   (2.97)  
GrntDtVegaNew   1.16
***
   0.20
***
   0.16
***
 
   (3.87)   (4.63)   (3.01) 
ChngVegaNew   1.61   0.29   0.37 
   (1.09)   (1.07)   (1.57) 
          
          
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R
2 
(%)  11.59 11.61  7.74 7.75  9.36 9.40 
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Table 10 
Analysis of the vega-delta wedge 
This table reports the characteristics of firms in the top percentile of the vega-delta wedge. The vega-delta wedge is calculated for each firm-year as the 
difference between DFBETAVega and DFBETADelta. DFBETAVega  (DFBETADelta) is calculated for each measures of misreporting as the change in the regression 
coefficient on Vega (Delta) from including the respective firm-year in the third regression specification in Panel A of each of Tables 3, 4, and 5, respectively. 
This table reports mean values of variables used in our analyses for observations in the top percentile of the wedge, for all other observations, and the 
difference in means. OptionEquityRatio
 
is the ratio of option holdings of the top five executives to the total equity holdings (stock and options) of the top five 
executives. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), 
respectively. Sample includes 20,445 firm-years.  
 
  Discretion (Modified Jones)  Restatement  AAER 
Variable  Top 1% Others Diff.  Top 1% Others Diff.  Top 1% Others Diff. 
             
Misreporting variables           
Discretion (Modified Jones)  50.65 11.82 38.83***  18.56 12.14 6.41***  13.63 12.19 1.44* 
Discretion (Dechow-Dichev)  16.94 7.66 9.28***  9.98 7.73 2.25***  8.43 7.75 0.68 
Discretion (McNichols)  18.10 7.63 10.47***  9.77 7.72 2.05***  8.60 7.73 0.87 
Restatement  0.06 0.03 0.03*  1.00 0.02 0.98***  0.32 0.02 0.29*** 
AAER  0.02 0.02 0.01  0.18 0.02 0.16***  0.89 0.01 0.88*** 
             
Incentive variables            
CashComp  6.26 6.29 –0.03  6.42 6.29 0.12***  6.49 6.29 0.19*** 
Delta  4.42 4.46 –0.04  4.66 4.46 0.20**  5.23 4.46 0.78*** 
Vega  3.04 2.95 0.09  3.97 2.95 1.02***  3.95 2.95 1.00*** 
Ownership  1.52 1.34 0.18  1.09 1.34 -0.26***  1.28 1.34 -0.06 
OptionEquityRatio  0.78 0.71 0.07***  0.88 0.71 0.18***  0.83 0.71 0.12*** 
             
Control variables            
Size  7.14 7.27 –0.13  7.42 7.27 0.15  8.05 7.26 0.78*** 
BM  0.46 0.50 –0.03  0.46 0.50 –0.04**  0.43 0.50 –0.07*** 
Leverage  0.51 0.52 –0.01  0.46 0.52 –0.06***  0.55 0.52 0.03* 
FirmAge  22.05 26.12 –4.08***  21.33 26.13 –4.81***  22.87 26.12 –3.25*** 
ROA  –0.01 0.04 –0.05**  0.04 0.04 0.00  0.01 0.04 –0.03** 
Returns  0.19 0.14 0.05  0.26 0.14 0.11**  0.24 0.14 0.10 
Capital  0.31 0.32 –0.01  0.22 0.32 –0.10***  0.22 0.32 –0.10*** 
Intangibles  0.06 0.06 0.00  0.11 0.06 0.05***  0.06 0.06 0.00 
Financing  0.09 0.11 –0.01  0.13 0.11 0.02  0.11 0.11 0.01 
σCFO  0.07 0.06 0.01*  0.08 0.06 0.02***  0.07 0.06 0.01 
σSales  0.24 0.22 0.02  0.24 0.22 0.03*  0.25 0.22 0.03** 
Acquisition  0.03 0.04 –0.01  0.03 0.04 –0.01  0.14 0.04 0.09*** 
InterestCov  0.75 0.67 0.08  0.64 0.67 –0.04  0.81 0.67 0.14** 
SalesGrowth  0.12 0.14 –0.02  0.11 0.14 –0.03**  0.31 0.14 0.17*** 
Inventory  0.08 0.12 –0.04***  0.08 0.12 –0.03***  0.09 0.12 –0.03*** 
Receivables  0.14 0.15 –0.01  0.14 0.15 –0.01*  0.16 0.15 0.01** 
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